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FOREWORD 
Presented here are the proceedings of a series of lectures given at 
Stanford University in the spring quarter of 1963 by personnel of the 
Systems Division of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The lectures were 
part of the course work in the Space Technology Seminar, AE 298, 
conducted by Professor Howard Seifert of Stanford’s Department of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics, and were given on consecutive Wednes- 
days, starting May 1, 1963 and finishing June 5, 1963. 
The purpose of the JPL presentation was to describe systems engi- 
neering in space exploration to university graduate students, provide 
a technical series of lectures not normally given at universities, 
indicate some of the problems and the systems approach to these 
problems, and convey what systems engineering means to the mechani- 
cal engineer, electrical engineer, aeronautical engineer, chemical engi- 
neer, physicist, chemist, etc. Throughout the series, various examples of 
spacecraft and associated problems were discussed, including related 
experiences of the lecturers. The intent or philosophy behind the JPL 
seminar series was to provide a continuous integrated technical pro- 
gram ( not just a collection of heterogeneous technical lectures) which 
would describe the activities of one of seven technical divisions at JPL. 
The lecture series was sponsored by the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) at the suggestion of John Porter, Chief, 
JPL Support Office to the California Universities Council on Space 
Sciences (CUCOSS) , The overall technical editing of these proceed- 
ings and technical continuity in the seminar series were under the 
direction of Dr. C. R. Gates, Chief, and John G. Small, Deputy Chief, 
of the Systems Division at  JPL. 
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Systems Engineering in Space Exploration 
JOHN SMALL 
Deputy Chief, Systems Division 
The first discussion in this series presents an intro- 
duction to systems engineering as applied to planetary 
mission design. The various elements of the system will 
be described and related problems discussed. 
In general, systems engineering can be defined as the 
engineering approach used in design and development 
efforts of a complexity requiring the involvement of sev- 
eral basic engineering disciplines. “Engineering” implies 
the analysis, design, or test of hardware or operations to 
accomplish a given function. “Systems engineering” im- 
plies the coordination of several engineering disciplines 
in a single complex effort. 
In various projects, the systems engineer will be called 
cognizant engineer, project engineer, program engineer, 
or test engineer. He will be faced with problems of 
schedules and money allocation, and he will find it neces- 
sary to accomplish his task in spite of arbitrarily imposed 
and possibly unappreciated boundary conditions. For 
example, planetary spaceflight schedules are based upon 
planetary orbits; there cannot be any schedule slippage. 
Also, in order to avoid planet contamination in some 
missions, it may be necessary to sterilize equipment at 
temperatures well above those of standard operations. 
Each engineer, in designing a piece of hardware, is faced 
with many systems problems; and the systems engineer, 
the man who is charged with putting the various sub- 
systems together, is faced with even more difficult 
problems. He should understand at least the interfaces 
between the subsystems (the signals that flow from one 
piece of hardware to another), so that when the equip- 
ment is assembled, either mechanically or electrically, 
it operates properly because the people who designed 
the subsystems used the correct inputs and produced the 
proper outputs. 
In this seminar we are going to attempt to define and 
describe systems engineering within the framework of a 
series of discussions on the following subjects: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Systems engineering in space exploration 
Systems studies and functional design 
Systems analysis and optimization 
Spacecraft design and development* 
Launch and spaceflight operations 
Program engineering and project problems. 
“This material does not appear herein, but will be published later 
as an addendum to the present report. 
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In this, the first discussion of the series, I will describe 
some of the elements that we consider in a space system 
and some of the objectives that we attempt to reach. 
Figure 1 shows the major overall systems involved in 
space exploration-the Deep Space Instrumentation 
Facility (DSIF), the Space Flight Operations Facility 
(SFOF), the launch vehicle, and the spacecraft itself. The 
DSIF comprises three ground receiving stations. These 
stations are located so that, regardless of the relative 
positions of the Earth and the spacecraft, provided the 
spacecraft is in an equatorial or near-equatorial plane, we 
can always track the spacecraft and receive telemetry 
from it. The stations can receive communications with bit 
rates of about 4 or 5 bit/sec at a Mars-Earth distance, 
with the type of spacecraft now used. 
The SFOF integrates this telemetry information in real 
time and gives us the capability of making command 
decisions. We can steer the spacecraft. We can update 
certain events in the spacecraft in order to achieve our 
mission objective. 
The launch vehicle’s role is to inject the spacecraft on 
its mission’s trajectory. 
Figure 2 is a picture of Mars and is included here only 
to dramatize our objective. I think the picture may help to 
Fig. 2. Mars 
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING IN S P A C E  EXPLORATION 
point up the necessity of looking at the scientific as well as 
the engineering aspect of our mission. The mission of the 
spacecraft is, of course, to make scientific measurements. 
A spacecraft design for the projected 1964 Mars mis- 
sion is shown in Fig. 3. This particular design utilizes an 
octagonal base because we are using four solar panels 
as our power source. If we had designed a hexagonal 
base, we would probably have had three larger solar 
panels, and they would have been longer than those shown 
here; but this design looked to us to be a little easier to 
work with from a structural standpoint. Of course, this 
is a system tradeoff problem. The four-solar-panel design 
requires four opening mechanisms as against three for 
the other design, but, in this case, the structural problem 
was more difficult than the mechanism problem; so, on 
the basis of overall system reliability, we chose the four- 
panel model. 
We have been using solar panels ever since we started 
building Ranger spacecraft. Although, hypothetically, a 
nuclear power source would work excellently, it would 
pose delivery problems and system integration problems; 
and we have been able to assure ourselves that solar 
panels are more practicable for these spacecraft. 
On the tips of the solar panels are the solar sails. We 
expect that the effect of solar pressure on these sails will 
keep the center of pressure behind the center of gravity 
and result in spacecraft stability. 
The high-gain antenna shown in Fig. 3 is a fixed an- 
tenna. In previous designs these antennas have been 
movable, but since in the last half of the Earth-Mars 
trajectory the Earth-probe-Sun angle remains almost 
unchanged, we could actually use a fixed antenna in the 
Mars spacecraft. From a systems point of view this means 
that we don’t have to have bearings and equipment to 
operate the antenna in order to move it into different 
positions; therefore, we can eliminate that function. Near 
the Earth, the spacecraft pointing angle changes enough 
so that, in order to maintain telemetry, we utilize a low- 
gain and omnidirectional antenna. 
The temperature-control louvers shown in Fig. 3 are 
operated by bimetallic strips. As the material under the 
strips is heated by the Sun, the strips expand and contract 
and open and close the louvers. It is a closed-loop circuit. 
The equipment Mariner carries in order to make scien- 
tific measurements-the magnetometer, the cosmic dust 
3 
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Fig. 3. Mariner spacecraft 
detector, the ion chamber, and the vidicon-must be lo- 
cated as far as possible from the other equipment so as 
to avoid electronic and magnetic interactions. Thus, in 
effect, the science equipment and mission determine the 
spacecraft configuration, which basically must be kept 
as compact and rigid as possible. 
Figure 4 shows the type of hardware that is packaged 
into the spacecraft. Of course, the packaging must be 
compact and light, which means that the container walls 
must be as thin as possible. This particular photograph, 
which shows one of the cases of electronic gear, was 
taken when the equipment was on a shake table, and so 
it is a little misleading. The light-colored wires go to the 
shake-test recording equipment; only the large black 
cables are the actual packaged wiring system. Everything 
must, of course, be connected by the cabling that runs 
through the box, and, because of induction problems, 
everything must be designed SO that there is a minimum 
of cabling between items. There are many of these 
boxes on the spacecraft, and all must be integrated into 
the overall spacecraft operation. 
Figure 5 shows the systems test layout that we use to 
test the Mariner spacecraft in the laboratory. Although 
at this point the various subsystems would have already 
been tested, we wouldn’t yet have put them all together 
and run them in a systems test, which means a simu- 
lated in-flight operation of all the subsystems in their 
proper order. 
Basically, the method we use here is that of spacecraft 
development. First we put the structure together. Next 
we put in the cabling and the power and check out the 
equipment. Then we slowly add the more complicated 
pieces of equipment to see whether they have interactions 
and whether they will work in their environment-and 
environment here means electronic environment; there 
may be electronic interference between subsystems, or 
the output of a given subsystem may not be at  its mean 
value and may affect the input to the next subsystem so 
that the systems won’t operate properly when connected 
in the system. Without a system test, this wouldn’t be 
noticed. 
4 
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Fig. 4. Electronic gear packaging 
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Fig. 5. Mariner systems test layout 
Figure 5 shows the complex of ground support equip- 
ment which, through the cabling leads, operates the 
spacecraft. For a lunar shot test, simulated spacecraft 
operation for 70 or 80 hours would be required for all 
shake, temperature, and vacuum environments and the 
various combinations thereof. The resulting data are read 
out to ascertain whether the spacecraft is operating with- 
in the prescribed limits. 
In this type of test operation, the more data we gather, 
the more need we have for computers to store the data 
and to ring alarms relative to the measurements. For 
example, planetary shots involve mission times of a few 
hundred days, and to ensure reliability, we should oper- 
ate this system a few hundred times. The resulting data 
output, which is enormous, is programmed into a com- 
puter and an alarm system is activated if any of the 
various sulxystems give iiicasnremcnts outside the pre- 
scribed limits. 
Figure 6 shows the inside of the JPL spacc simu- 
lator. The view is from the spacecraft toward the ceiling. 
The hexagonally-shaped pebble bed receives sunlight 
from the top; the chamber has cold walls, simulating the 
6 
radiation of outer space. In our simulator we can’t just 
beam light at the spacecraft; we must try to simulate 
sunlight, and we also must maintain the temperature and 
vacuum of the simulator as close to space conditions as 
possible. 
This particular chamber was not ready when we made 
the Venus 1962 flight, and we had to proceed with very 
marginal simulation in a small chamber. As a result we 
made some engineering errors, and the spacecraft tem- 
peratures in the 1962 flight were higher than anticipated. 
Figure 7 pictures a model of a future deep space 
instrumentation antenna, a 210-ft dish. At present we are 
using 85-ft dishes. With a 210-ft dish, which will be 
available in two or three years, we will be able to in- 
crease our reception capability about 5 times. A 210-ft 
dish will be installed at the Goldstone DSIF site. 
An inside view of the original spaceflight operations 
facility is given in Fig. 8. (A much more comprehen- 
sive facility is being built for future flights.) It is basically 
a control center which converts raw telemetry data into 
JPL SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS 
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Fig. 6. JPL space simulator 
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Fig. 7. DSlF antenna 
actual physical measurements and then into actual physi- 
cal parameters. The purpose is to keep track of the 
spacecraft in real time. The engineer must have data on 
temperatures, gas supply, signal levels, etc., in order to 
know the status of the spacecraft; this information is 
received from the SFOF. 
Although all this telemetry information is available 
during a flight, man still has to make the decisions and 
act on the information, and must be very aware of time. 
The launch vehicle errors, for example, cannot be pre- 
dicted and are significant enough so that we must do a 
midcourse maneuver for either lunar or planetary mis- 
sions. We don’t know what the vector velocity require- 
ment is for the maneuver, and we have to wait until we 
have enough data. We want to make the maneuver as 
soon as possible, so that correction takes the least amount 
of energy, but we want to wait as long as possible, until 
we have the best information. We don’t know what to do 
until we look at the data. 
Up to this point I have been discussing the various 
parts of the system that are required to accomplish a 
deep space mission. Now I shall discuss one set of spe- 
cific mission objectives-objectives which we would help 
Fig. 8. Space Flight Operations Facility 
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generate, but which would be handed to us by manage- 
ment as requirements. It is at this point that the engineer 
can relate one set of requirements with another and make 
decisions as to system tradeoffs. 
The following set of mission objectives, listed in order 
of priority, could be used for a Mars mission: 
1. Conduct close-up (flyby) scientific observations of 
the planet Mars during the next opportunity and 
transmit the results of those observations back to 
Earth. 
2. Provide, to the greatest possible extent, information 
bearing on the question of life on Mars. Either an 
IR grating spectrometer or a TV system, or both, 
will be carried solely for planetary measurements. 
3. Provide experience and knowledge concerning the 
performance of the basic engineering equipment of 
an attitude-stabilized flyby spacecraft during a 
long-duration flight in space, farther from the Sun 
than is the Earth. 
4. Perform certain field and/or particle measurements 
in interplanetary space during the trip and in the 
vicinity of Mars. 
Fig. 9. Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 1963 
9 
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5. Provide a design compatible with repeating the 
same or a very similar flyby mission to Mars during 
the following Mars opportunity with a minimum of 
modifications. 
Now, having discussed system parts and mission ob- 
jectives, I want to illustrate some of the other require- 
ments of a comp!ete system. Likc zverj..one else iil (lie 
space business, we at JPL are going through a complete 
building program in order to have the necessary facilities 
to accomplish our missions. Figure 9 is a mid-1963 photo- 
graph of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. I think it is 
remarkable that, of the buildings shown, only one is used 
for spacecraft assembly; all the others are engaged in 
science and engineering efforts. This situation is pretty 
much the reverse of the old-fashioned airplane manufac- 
turing operation. 
Figure 10 illustrates another requirement of systems 
engineering-a chart that delineates functions and re- 
sponsibilities. At JPL, at present, our organization chart 
sets out seven basic work areas-Systems, Space Sciences, 
Telecommunications, Guidance and Control, Engineering 
Mechanics, Engineering Facilities, and Propulsion. No- 
tice that although the Laboratory is called a “propulsion” 
, 
laboratory, propulsion accounts for only a small fraction 
of the work area. When you are told that five years ago 
it accounted for half the Laboratory’s work, and that 
ten years ago it accounted for fully three-fourths of 
it, you can understand, I’m sure, the organizational diffi- 
culties involved in reorienting disciplines and shifting 
emphasis. Today, perhaps 70 percent of our work is in 
the fieici of eiectronics. 
The work areas at the Laboratory have the following 
functions. Space Sciences is responsible for the procure- 
ment and manufacture of equipment for spacecraft and 
equipment for making scientific measurements. Space 
Sciences people review scientific objectives to see that 
we engage in projects that help to advance science. 
The Telecommunications Division is responsible for the 
Deep Space Instrumentation Facility, the spacecraft radio 
data encoder, and command subsystems. Guidance and 
Control, in addition to activities implied by its title, is 
responsible for spacecraft power and for the on-board 
computer. Engineering Mechanics is responsible for struc- 
tures, mechanics, fluid dynamics, and temperature control. 
Engineering Facilities is a large division with responsi- 
bility for ground computers, environmental chambers, 
and wind tunnels. The work of the Propulsion Division 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
L. A. DUBRIDGE, PRESIDENT 
I 
JET PROPULSION LABORATORY 
W. H. PICKERING, DIRECTOR 
I 
STAFF ENGINEERS AND RELIABILITY PUBLIC EDUCATION CALIFORNIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL MANAGEMENT 
SCIENTISTS ASSURANCE AND INFORMATION ON SPACE SCIENCE INFORMATION 
~ - 
RESEARCH AND ADVANCED BUSINESS 
DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION 
I 
I I I I I I 
SPACE 
SYSTEMS SC,ENCES TELECOMMUNICATIONS Gu,!.!.~~~o~D PROPULSION FAClLlTl ES MACHANICS 
Fig. 10. JpL organization chart 
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involves both liquid- and solid-propellant spacecraft 
systems, such as the midcourse propulsion system. 
The Systems Division is responsible for the overall 
spacecraft system-for tying all the various efforts together 
and delivering a complete system. The Systems Division 
also has responsibility for the Space Flight Operations 
Facility. 
As shown in Fig. 10, JPL has subdivided its overall 
program into four main projects: Ranger, Mariner C, 
Surveyor, and Voyager. hiariner R, the successful 1962 
Venus flight, is no longer shown on the chart. Ranger is a 
lunar mission. Alariner C is the 1964 Mars mission. Sur- 
wyor is a lunar soft-lander project which is being man- 
aged by JPL and built by Hughes Aircraft; it represents 
a new type of job, a management operation, for the en- 
gineers at the Laboratory. The Voyager Project involves 
future Mars or Venus missions and is only in the study 
phase. 
Also shown by Fig. 10 are the other areas of support 
that the Laboratory requires. We have staff engineers 
and scientists. \Ve have an Office of Reliability Assurance 
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING I N  SPACE EXPLORATION 
that is placed high in the organization so that it can be as 
effective as possible. We have a Public Information and 
Education Office and an office representing the Califor- 
nia Universities Council on Space Sciences; NASA sup- 
ports university research. We have offices of Management 
Information, Research and Advanced Development, and 
Business Administration. 
As you can see, our organization is quite complex and 
requires a fairly large number of people in the various 
categories-scientific, engineering, administrative, techni- 
cal, secretarial, etc. At present, we employ about 4000 
people, of whom about 1500 are engineers or scientists. 
Now I will discuss another of the boundary conditions 
that we must work with-the schedule. Figure 11 shows 
a typical schedule that we have used for overall control 
of the Mariner system. In some respects, schedule prob- 
lems are simpler in Mariner than in other projects, since 
we know the time at which the planet will make its 
closest approach to Earth and we design for that. 
You will notice that our scheduling is done in terms of 
time periods, milestones, that relate to completion dates 
of the various events. 
v MILESTONE 
MILESTONE COME 
Fig. 11. Mariner schedule 
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In the preliminary design phase, the Systems Division 
calls together people from the various disciplines, and the 
engineering mission is discussed and analyzed. Projec- 
tions are made as to what the spacecraft system must 
accomplish and how. Proposals for the substitution of 
new equipment for flight-tried equipment are heard and 
debated, and judgments are made on the basis of mis- 
sion objectives. For exazple, so~p.ecne rxqj suggest the 
use of a new type of transmitter, while Systems people 
may want to stay with the type that has already flown 
and worked. Here, mission objectives and system require- 
ments are the ruling criteria. Of course, on this point, 
everyone would like to have two transmitters and two 
receivers, and some method of switching, so that if one 
piece of equipment failed we would still get some data. 
Each division then writes a functional specification-a 
description of what that division’s subsystem is going to 
accomplish. Functional specifications are written for both 
spacecraft equipment and operational support equipment 
or ground test equipment. There are also project require- 
ments-requirements, for example, relating to the amount 
of testing that must be done and the type of quality 
control that must be applied. 
Flow plans are then made to describe the method of 
equipment generation. For example, the structure for 
the directional antenna may be built by Engineering 
Mechanics, the electronics by Communications, the actu- 
ators by Guidance people, and flow plans are needed to 
describe the overall operation. 
Documents are then written to explain the interfaces 
between the different major systems: between the space- 
craft and the SFOF/DSIF and between the spacecraft 
and the launch vehicle. We can’t build the spacecraft, 
the SFOF, the DSIF, and the launch vehicle without 
determining how the various pieces of hardware are go- 
ing to interact. The spacecraft/launch vehicle interface 
involves problems of RF interference, cleanliness, sterili- 
zation, etc. 
Then, as shown in Fig. 11, there are design and quality 
assurance reviews. Of course, each subsystem area has 
its own reviews, but Systems and Project also review to 
see that overall progress is what it should be. For example, 
in one project, in the last stage of the communications 
system preliminary design we couldn’t decide whether 
to use an amplitron or standard cavity amplifier. Two 
months later, the design review revealed that the anipli- 
tron wasn’t very stable, that it would not always do what 
it was supposed to do. We also learned that this type of 
cavity amplifier is made only in West Germany. If we 
had obtained that information earlier, maybe we could 
have gotten someone in the U.S. to obtain a patent and 
build the particular equipment. 
On certain dates-differing, of course, from area to 
area-equipment design is frozen; after tho freeze date 
any change must be approved. This control is called 
engineering change request control, and is applied in 
order to maintain system compatibility. It permits every- 
one to know what his inputs are and what outputs are 
required from him. 
During type-approval testing the subsystems or parts 
of subsystems are subjected to levels of testing-shake, 
temperature, even possibly sterilization-of orders of 
magnitude 30 to 50 percent higher than those expected. 
Then, as shown in Fig. 11, we put together a proof-test 
model, which could actually fly, and we test it. \\’e try 
to do a design evaluation of the PTM in a life test. For a 
Venus flight we would like to run the spacecraft in an 
environmental facility, with some of the ground support 
equipment, for at least as long a period as in an actual 
Venus flight. 
Now, to review, I would like to list the major systems 
involved in a space mission, and then the major engineer- 
ing efforts required. 
The major systems are: 
1. Launch vehicle and complex 
2. Spacecraft 
3. DSIF 
4. SFOF 
5 .  Mission analysis; performance, schedule, cost 
reliability. 
The major engineering efforts are: 
1. Mission objectives 
2. Preliminary design 
3. Design 
4. Design verification 
5 .  Test and operations 
6. Flight operations 
7. Data analysis 
12 
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The primary input, mission objectives, dictates the com- 
peting characteristics of the mission: namely, the order of 
importance of such factors as performance, schedule, cost, 
reliability, types of telemetry data to be returned, etc. 
In the preliminary design, the systems engineer at- 
tempts to tie together the various subsystems, to look at 
the interfaces and resolve problems so as to benefit the 
overall system and meet the mission objectives. For ex- 
ample, if we are short on power, we might want to 
increase the solar panel area or to add another battery; 
but doing this might mean a major change for the power 
people, and they would argue against it. A decision has 
to be made. 
disallow a change in one area that would adversely affect 
some other area. 
In design verification, the spacecraft is connected with 
the ground support equipment so that we can make cer- 
tain that it is performing as it was designed. Each part 
of the design, each part of the system, must be verified. 
Temperature control verification is carried out in the space 
simulator, and the transmitter function may be verified 
by operations with the DSIF to determine that the trans- 
mitter signal can be received and handled properly. 
In the test and operations phase, the spacecraft under- 
goes such tests as are necessary to indicate that it is ready. 
In the design phase, the Systems effort is to coordinate 
the overall operation; perhaps it would be necessary to 
In the data analysis phase, a determination is made as 
to what measurements are to be made and how they are 
- 
_I) ENCOUNTER SCIENCE I ' I  
I 1  - - -+ - - - - - - - - I  
- - ENCOUNTER DATA 
- 
I 
I 1  ENGINEERING FU NCTl ONS 
- ENGINEERING AND CRUISE DATA I I 
- POWER 
PYROTECHNICS 
I I I  
Fig. 12. Mariner block diagram 
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going to be measured. When the raw telemetry data is 
received, it is not in engineering units. The data must be 
converted into engineering units and then into physical 
parameters. For example, signals are received which in- 
dicate the pressure and temperature of the gas supply for 
attitude control. These signals are converted into lb/in.2 
for the pressure and "F for the temperature, but this 
information won't direct!y icdicatz the m i s s  of gas that 
is left. So the information is programmed into a computer 
and is read out as the mass of the gas. In a real-time sense 
in the critical areas, data must be read out in physical 
parameters, so that immediate action may be taken if 
indicated. 
Figure 12 is a much simplified Mariner-type block 
diagram which illustrates the interactions of twelve 
spacecraft subsystems and prelaunch operations. The 
coded arrow system shows the interactions. For example, 
the encounter data, measured by encounter science, is 
fed into the data automation system (DAS). From the 
DAS it goes to the tape recorder, and from the tape 
recorder to the data encoder. The data encoder con- 
verts the data to the proper format for transmission and 
feeds it to the communications subsystem. The communi- 
cations subsystem transmits the data to Earth over the 
high-gain or omnidirectional antenna. 
When commands are sent to the spacecraft, they come 
in through the antennas to the command subsystem and 
I 
are fed out from there. For example, to tell the attitude 
control system to move to a given position in order to do 
the midcourse maneuver, the command would go to the 
attitude control. The same command would also tell 
the power system to go on batteries, instead of on solar 
panels, because of loss of Sun attitude by the spacecraft. 
A command would also go to the CC&S to tell the pyro- 
technics to fire so as to do the midcourse propulsion 
maneuver. 
For each one of the subsystems, a block diagram of 
much more complexity than that shown in Fig. 12 is 
traced through by Systems engineers so that they can 
understand the various interactions and will be aware of 
where subsystem redundance can be used to give a maxi- 
mum probability of success to the mission or where 
commands can be used to override a failed mode within 
a spacecraft. 
An understanding of block diagrams is required of any 
engineer relative to either system or subsystem. Circuit 
data sheets are made which show the data flow between 
subsystems, and are detailed as to voltage and current 
and the variations thereof and can be interpreted as sub- 
system inputs and outputs. 
The preceding discussion was an attempt to show the 
problems and procedures used in system engineering as 
applied to spacecraft missions. 
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I would like to speak to you today on the topic of 
Systems Design and Systems Design Studies. I will at- 
tempt to explain what I mean by these terms by giving 
some definitions and some examples, and then try to 
show you how we use these activities in such major pro- 
grams as Ranger and Surveyor. 
' 
Although it might be termed a truism, I believe it is 
important enough to state specifically: the basic purpose 
of any study activity is to provide information for a deci- 
sion. It is extremely important to answer the question: 
What type of information is required by the decision 
maker and, hence, from the study activity? 
There are four general categories of information a per- 
son would like to have available upon which to base a 
decision. This decision might be to begin a project, to 
continue a project, or to cancel a project. The types of 
information sought by an engineering study fall into four 
categories: 
1. System performance and system description. 
2. Schedule of accomplishment of mission objective. 
3. Probability of mission accomplishment. 
4. Cost of mission accomplishment. 
I believe the first and second categories of information 
will be relatively familiar to you. The first category 
would be termed Systems Performance and Description. 
This is comprised of a technical description of the system 
design and a statement of what it can do in terms of 
mission accomplishment. 
The second category answers the question: Consistent 
with the requisite level of systems performance, what is 
the Probability of Mission Success? That is, how many 
launches must you perform to have a successful mission? 
If the system will only work one time in five, this may be 
important to your program. 
Once we felt we understood the problem of describing 
systems performance and determining the probability of 
mission accomplishment, we began to try to develop 
information in two additional categories as well. These 
are: Consistent with the levels of systems performance and 
probability of success; what is the Schedule upon which 
this mission could be performed? Fourthly, Consistent 
with systems performance, probability of accomplishment, 
and the schedule; what is the Cost of accomplishing this 
task? So, depending on the type of decision to be made, 
we are often asked to perform a study which will provide 
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the information in categories one and two and quite often 
in categories three and four as well. 
Since we are making decisions based upon the informa- 
tion from studies, we find it very important to be able to 
describe the depth of the study effort which we are about 
to carry out or have completed. An engineer is most 
familiar with what could be termed practical systems, 
i.e., systems which can be brought into being. Further, an 
engineer feels most at ease in working with systems or 
subsystems with which he is familiar so that he can feel 
quite confident in making statements about them, and 
stake his reputation on such statements. This would be 
termed a study of practical systems. Unfortunately, on a 
complicated system such as Ranger or Surveyor it would 
be very expensive in both time and resources to conduct 
a study activity of sufficient depth so that a responsible 
engineer could satisfy himself that it is a practical sys- 
tem. It often turns out that this depth of study may not 
or cannot be justified economically; studies of lesser 
depth may be needed to assess the “pros” and “cons” of 
the system and justify committing additional resources. 
This has caused us to develop study techniques of prac- 
ticable systems. This distinction may at first appear to be 
simply a shade-of-grey difference from a practical system, 
and yet strictly speaking there is a black and white 
distinction between the terms practical and practicable. 
Practicable systems are those systems which are thought 
to be capable of being brought into being. Therefore, the 
result of practicable system study may be a description of 
the system and its performance but in addition there will 
be an attached list of problem areas which, in effect, de- 
scribe the status of the system in terms of its evolution 
towards a practical system. In the case of a practical sys- 
tem, in addition to the systems description and its per- 
formance, one could go so far as to generate the detailed 
drawing from which the system could be built. 
Now, to better understand this term practicable, I would 
like to define several different types of studies that one 
could undertake. They differ primarily in depth of effort. 
These definitions are my own. I believe they are a con- 
sistent set among themselves. The first of these I term 
conceptual design. The basic feature of a conceptual 
design is that it is a design of a practicable system. Its 
primary use is to provide information to those people 
who are planning programs. The information provided is 
usually an estimate of the capability of a system. This 
allows its utility in accomplishing overall program or 
project objectives to be assessed. For example: the first 
step performed in initiating the Surveyor project (the 
Surveyor is a lunar soft-landing spacecraft) was to con- 
duct a conceptual design of the spacecraft. This was an 
effort of some six-weeks’ duration which tried to find the 
pertinent performance factors of the system and to list 
the outstanding problem areas. With the completion of the 
study and listing of the information in these two cate- 
gories (and although there were still a large number of 
problems to be solved) the Laboratory undertook the task 
of eiiduaiing the utiiity of such a system in accomplish- 
ing the goals of the Lunar Program. Such a system might 
not be worth the investment to bring it into being. It 
might turn out to be unreliable or too costly. In the case 
of Surveyor the judgment was that it was neither of these. 
Now, if we’ve gone through a conceptual design, and 
the result still makes sense-that is, we feel that the sys- 
tem under study is useful and we think the problems can 
be overcome-we then go on to the next level of study 
activity. 
The next level of study is termed design study. The 
major difference between a design study and a concep- 
tual design is that we are, by definition, constrained by 
the study to practical systems and subsystems. This may 
mean we will have to accept a lesser performance if we 
do not choose to advance the “state of the art”; or it may 
mean that to attain a specific level of performance, a 
considerably deeper “look,” such that the result of the 
study can be termed practical, may be required. The prob- 
lems uncovered in a conceptual design must be solved 
prior to or during the design study. To achieve this result, 
a design study is often a study of trade-offs between the 
various subsystems so that practicality for the subsystems 
and the system can be achieved. 
To return to my Surveyor example, when we continued 
that effort beyond the conceptual design stage, we next 
looked at the alternate system concepts, all of which were 
potentially capable of performing the mission. However, 
these various alternates gave us different options in terms 
of the four major factors of performance, probability of 
success, cost, and schedule. Some systems had more per- 
formance, but were less reliable; or they were more ex- 
pensive; or took twice as long to bring into being. In each 
case, however, the design was of a practical system. This 
spectrum of results allowed us to assess the utility of the 
Surveyor system, but with more confidence in the factors 
of performance, probability of accomplishment, schedule, 
and cost, which now had considerably more supporting 
material behind them. 
At this point I would now like to define a more familiar 
type of study-preliminary design. Usually upon the com- 
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pletion of a design study and prior to the start of prelim- 
inary design, a major review of the design study has 
occurred and a decision has been made to go ahead with 
the project, That is, the project has been formally initi- 
ated. This means we are committed to a no-nonsense, 
detailed design effort to bring a flight system into being. 
Now we are dealing with very specific characteristics 
based on the design study work. We now have a defini- 
tive list of the different specific features that the prelim- 
inary design must detail in great depth. 
In Fig. 1, I have tried to show the relationship of the 
three types of studies which I have just defined. To 
the left, we have the area of conceptual design, dealing 
in terms of feasibility with those systems which are 
practicable. Next we have the overlap of this conceptual 
design into design study. Usually in this overlap area there 
is a period of review wherein the results of the conceptual 
design are examined and a decision is made as to whether 
or not to continue and to increase the depth of the study 
activity. In general, there are only two ways we can go 
from a practicable system to a practical system. One, as I 
indicated earlier, is to reduce the goals of systems perfor- 
mance and reliability until the design lies within the 
realm of the state of the art. Or, as I’ve indicated in 
Fig. 1, to carry on a large amount of supporting advanced 
dcve!opment effort directed toward solving the list of 
problem areas that are turned up in the conceptual de- 
sign process. 
Also, I should point out that one tends to narrow the 
range of topics under study as a function of time. Concep- 
tual designs may cover a rather broad range of objectives. 
SUPPORTING 
ADV&NCED DEVELOPMENT 
m 
I 
I I  
INCREASING TIME 
1 INCREASING DEPTH 
P d n c T i c A B L E d  PRACTICAL FEASIBILITY 
rn 
b 
Fig. 1. Relationship of study activities 
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Design studies usually cover a more clearly and more 
tightly specified set of requirements assumptions. Finally, 
during the preliminary design study, we become very spe- 
cific, and at its conclusion we will have a very detailed 
specific concept. And of course, as we have proceeded, 
we have invested an increasing amount of time and re- 
sources to increase the depth of effort. 
So far I have talked only about the depth of study 
activity. As I have indicated, one can also discuss and 
describe the breadth or range over which such study 
activities can be done. I’ll try to define a few of these 
areas for you. The term component is probably self- 
explanatory. A module is that collection of components 
required to perform a single function. A subsystem is 
then a grouping of modules which perform “like” func- 
tions. Good examples of such a subsystem would be a 
power subsystem, an attitude-control subsystem, a guid- 
ance subsystem, or a sequencing subsystem. A system 
then is the collection and combination of these subsys- 
tems integrated to perform a specific mission or to 
achieve a system objective. Typical examples of systems 
would be the entire spacecraft, the entire launch vehicle. 
We take the combinations of the systems such as launch 
vehicle, spacecraft, and ground tracking net, and with 
these we perform a mission. A project is a grouping of 
missions. This grogping is iisnally based upon some com- 
mon feature such as the capability of accomplishing a 
unified goal or exploiting the use of a particular launch 
vehicle, etc. For example, the Ranger Project is that por- 
tion of the Lunar Program designed to return knowledge 
about the lunar surface by utilizing the capability of the 
Atlas/Agena launch vehicle. The individual Ranger 
spacecraft perform a variety of related missions in deter- 
mining various facts about the lunar surface. The com- 
mon denominator is the fact that they are all about 
the same weight. This weight limit is set by the injection- 
energy capability of the launch vehicle, the Atlas/Agena. 
In a similar manner, the Surveyor Project is composed of 
those lunar missions to be undertaken with the Atlas/ 
Centaur launch vehicle. A program would be the com- 
bination of the various projects. A good example is the 
unmanned lunar exploration program conducted by JPL. 
This is currently comprised of two projects, the Ranger 
and the Surveyor projects, and a project in the study 
phase utilizing the Saturn launch vehicle, the Prospector. 
It is actually possible to conduct studies over this entire 
regime. That is, all the way from a single component, 
clear through to a program. It is obvious that not all of 
these would be termed systems studies. In general, the 
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study activity performed in an integrated systems sense 
does not go much below the subsystem level. However, 
studies have been performed of various systems, various 
missions, and various projects. 
It is possible, by taking my definitions of depth and 
breadth of study effort, to create the matrix (Fig. 2) 
relating these various activities. We have done sbddies a: 
one time or another for almost every one of the elements 
contained in this matrix. 
I BREADTH 
1 I I I I I COMPONENT 1 I I I 
I I I I I 
I MODULE I I I I 
I ! I I I 
SUB -SY STEM 
SYSTEM 
FLIGHT 
I I I I I 
I PROJECT I 
I I I I I 
PROGRAM 
Fig. 2. Matrix of study 
I would like to now go into the methodology of per- 
forming a systems study, and try to describe how one 
goes about performing a study such as I have referred 
to. These studies are actually simple to do. There is a lot 
of hard work, but the procedure is relatively straight- 
forward. 
Figure 3 (items 1-3) contains the basic information one 
needs to begin the study. This actually might be called a 
formal statement of the problem to be solved. We use these 
three subcategories to divide the problem statement. The 
first category is straightforward. It is a definition of 
the study objectives: that is, what problem is the study 
to explore? To go back to the example of spacecraft 
studies, the objective may be to perform a particular 
measurement on the lunar surface or on the surface of a 
planet. The second portion of the definition of the prob- 
lem is the statement of the constraints and boundary 
conditions which must be observed during the study. By 
this I mean the practical limitations placed on the study. 
For example, this category would define the injection 
energy and accuracy capability of the launch vehicle. We 
1 8  
I. DEFINITION OF THE OBJECTIVES 
2. DETERMINATION OF THE CONSTRAINTS AND BOUNDARY 
CONDITIONS 
3. IDENTIFICATION AND ORDERING OF COMPETING 
CHARACTERISTICS 
4. ESTABLISH THE FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
5, n r T T n a . ’ L l r  - 5 . -  
6. STUDY THE INTERACTIONS AMONG THE ALTERNATES 
7 IDENTIFY AND SELECT COMPATIBLE ALTERNATES 
8. DOCUMENT THE FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
VL I C n i v i i I v r  I HE LLTERNATE CONCEPTS SATISFYING 
THE REQUIREMENTS 
Fig. 3. Methodology of study 
do not design the launch vehicle at  JPL but we acknowl- 
edge the fact that they are expensive, that they come in 
specific generations of vehicles, and hence only certain 
capabilities and accuracies are available within a specific 
time period. Thus, they provide a real constraint on the 
design. We have an Atlas/Centaur; it makes little sense 
to use an “AtZas/Centaur and a half.” A similar limitation 
in a different technical area is the Deep Space Instru- 
mentation Facility. This is the world-wide tracking net- 
work that NASA uses to track all spacecraft operating in 
deep space. It is designed to operate at  certain specified 
frequencies, to have certain sensitivities in terms of 
reception capability, and to have certain transmission 
capabilities. In general, because of the expense and lead 
time involved in changing such characteristics of the 
Deep Space Instrumentation Facility, its capabilities at 
any specific time become a real constraint upon the study 
of a system which must operate in that same time period. 
Thirdly, in the areas where an engineer is asked to exercise 
judgment, there may be some preferential order of com- 
peting characteristics. For example, suppose I have a 
variety of ways to accomplish a specific mission. Some 
are more expensive, others less reliable, others may be 
better schedule-wise, still others may have more perfor- 
mance. It is obvious that in most cases we will not 
achieve an optimum solution, that is, the solution with 
the most performance, the quickest, the cheapest, the 
most reliable. In fact, it probably doesn’t exist. So, in 
areas where trade-offs must be made, the ordering of 
these competing characteristics in admnce helps set the 
philosophy underlying the entire study or design effort. 
If we can get a clear statement of the problem in 
terms of information in these three categories, then we 
are in pretty good shape in accomplishing the overall 
study itself. 
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The next step we cany out is to interpret the statement 
of mission objectives into a listing of those functional 
requirements which must be met to accomplish the mis- 
sion. At this point we are still treating the system as “black 
box.” That is, if you saw this spacecraft out in space, 
what would be its characteristics perceivable to you as an 
observer from the outside. We have not yet selected spe- 
cific ways of carrying out the requisite functions. 
I. MAKE SCIENTIFIC MEASUREMENTS 
2. MAKE ENGINEERING MEASUREMENTS 
3. PROVIDE DATA HANDLING FUNCTIONS 
4. SUPPLY POWER 
5. TRACK AND COMMUNICATE 
6. CONTROL AND SEQUENCING 
7. GUIDE 
8. IMPART IMPULSE 
9. CONTROL ATTITUDE 
IO. CONTROL ENVIRONMENT 
I I. EXTENSION 
12. ARTICULATION 
Fig. 4. Functional requirements 
In Fig. 4, I have listed the functional requirement cate- 
gories that we find appropriate to our work in the design 
of spacecraft. There are certainly other listings and defi- 
nitions of functional requirements which are appropriate 
to other engineering fields, However, this particular list 
seems to be most useful in our area of spacecraft design. 
The first of these is rather obvious: that is, to make scien- 
tific measurements. Since the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
is not directly engaged in the various manned spaceflight 
programs, this category is one of the foundations upon 
which we have built our entire organization. As is ob- 
vious, there is a large number of categories one could 
develop by dividing space up into various regions: inter- 
planetary space, the surface of the Moon, the atmospheres 
of the various planets, the surfaces of the various planets. 
All of these fall under the Laboratory’s general responsi- 
bility for the unmanned lunar and planetary exploration 
program. 
The second category is to make engineering measure- 
ments. Typical of such measurements are those which 
allow us to understand the condition of the spacecraft 
itself: that is, monitor its performance, any abnormality 
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in its performance, or potential problem or failure areas. 
The next category is to provide a data handling func- 
tion. This category encompasses the entire handling of 
the data from when it first originates in an instrument 
or sensor (such as categories 1 and 2) until it comes out as 
data at the DSIF. 
The fourth category is to supply power. We may not 
know exactly what power source we may use, but it is 
possible to determine the power requirements as a func- 
tion of flight time, and often the optimum power system 
will be determined by the character of this profile and 
the total demand placed upon the power system. 
We then have the fifth category of tracking and com- 
munications. This is an obvious category: (1) to track 
the spacecraft so that we are aware of its position in 
space; (2) to communicate with the spacecraft, both to 
send commands to it and to receive data from it. 
The next category is one of control and sequencing. 
Again, you may not know the exact mechanism you are 
talking of here, but you may find it necessary to shift 
among .alternate data-taking modes, to provide timing 
pulses to other subsystems, or to perform a series of 
operations in some order or sequence. 
Category seven is one of guiding the spacecraft. The 
term guide is used in a very general sense and means to 
control the flight path of the spacecraft. For example, 
a mission may require that the spacecraft pass within a 
certain distance of a prescribed object in space. This 
system provides such control of the trajectory of the 
spacecraft. In terms of providing guidance references, 
you may not know exactly the sensors to be used, but you 
are able to state the requirements on the overall system. 
The next category is to impart impulse. By this, I mean 
to change the momentum of the spacecraft. The require- 
ment in this category for a lunar landing spacecraft is 
obvious. On most trajectories you arrive at the vicinity 
of the Moon going approximately 8-9,000 ft per sec. If you 
wish to land you must impart impulse to the spacecraft 
system to slow it to some nominal speed at touchdown. 
The next functional category is one of controlling atti- 
tude. This requirement may arise from the desire to be 
able to point an instrument in a particular direction. It 
may come from the requirement to point a rocket motor 
in a particular direction so as to control the flight path. 
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It might arise out of the area of tracking and communica- 
tions. To provide adequate bandwidth to communicate it 
may be necessary to point a directional antenna towards 
the Earth. 
The tenth category is one of controlling the environ- 
ment. By this I mean, controlling the on-board envi- 
ronment within proper operating limits for the equipment 
in the spacecraft. For spacecraft operating primarily on 
near-miss and/or deep space missions, this becomes pri- 
marily a matter of thermal control. For spacecraft soft- 
landing on the lunar surface or on the surface of a planet, 
it may involve considerably more than that. 
The next category is one of extension. By this I mean 
the simple extension or erection of devices from the main 
body of the spacecraft. A good example arises from the 
problem involved with carrying a magnetometer on a 
spacecraft. Because of the magnetic fields generated 
by a spacecraft, it is highly desirable to get physical 
separation between the main body of the spacecraft 
and the magnetometer itself. This may be accomplished 
by a telescoping boom which provides this physical 
separation. 
The twelfth category is one of articulation. The require- 
ment for articulation usually arises from the fact that an 
instrument will be required to observe a planet or other 
object as the spacecraft flies past it. We are then faced 
with the conflicting requirements of maintaining refer- 
ence axes for stabilization to provide solar power, to pro- 
vide directional communications back to the Earth, and 
now to point this instrument at a target body. Rather 
than relinquish the basic reference axes, the trade-off 
may indicate a boom, with the tracking instrument on 
the end, articulated relative to the rest of the spacecraft. 
Once we have identified the functional requirements 
that the system should exhibit, the next step is to identify 
the various subsystem concepts and determine the vari- 
ous subsystem mechanizations available to provide the 
functions required. For example, within the time scale 
required, there may be several ways in which to provide 
power; or there may be several different possible attitude- 
reference systems, all of which satisfy the requirements 
of both guidance and attitude stabilization. 
In addition to the various possible ways of meeting 
these functional requirements, the study leader will also 
ask the subsystem people who provide this information to 
also provide information as to subsystem cost, reliability, 
state of the art, and schedule. It is at this point that 
we start to collect the various pieces of information 
that we will eventually combine into statements as to the 
probability of mission success, the overall schedule, and 
the overall cost of the mission. These statements are built 
upon the base of subsystem information collected at this 
phase of the study process. What we are gathering is 
the parametric informatior? or? the variaus passibk mcch- 
anizations at the subsystem level. With this base of infor- 
mation on the subsystem mechanizations, we then began 
to group these mechanizations in various combinations, 
generating, in the process, system concepts illustrating 
possible system philosophies. Once we have grouped 
these subsystems into systems concepts, we then go 
further and determine the interactions between respec- 
tive subsystems. These interactions represent some of 
the problems which must be solved in the course of the 
design process. 
A good example of a potential systems integration prob- 
lem is posed by an RTG power supply, the radioactive- 
isotope thermal generator system. Basically, this form of 
power supply consists of a group of thermocouples in- 
serted in a radioactive source which gives off heat. The 
thermocouples operate across the thermal difference 
which exists from within the radioactive source and the 
outside environment and convert the thermal energy to 
electrical energy. This is a highly desirable type of power 
supply in the sense, first, that the radioactive decay 
process is relatively immune to external disturbances, and 
second, that it does not demand any preferential pointing 
direction as a solar panel might. Unfortunately, RTG’s 
have a number of major drawbacks which must be faced 
when they are integrated into a system. One is that they 
are not thermally efficient. For each unit of energy 
they convert into electricity, they give off a large number 
of units of waste thermal energy which must be dissi- 
pated. For example, an RTG power supply which pro- 
duces perhaps 50 watts of electrical power may produce 
some 400500 watts of thermal energy which must be dis- 
sipated. We are then faced with the question: If we use 
such a power supply, how do we dissipate this heat? By 
being aware of such potential integration problems as 
this we are able to go through the various system con- 
cepts and get a fairly good engineering “feel” for which 
ones are compatible and which are incompatible out of 
all the combinations that might be possible. Once we 
have found these compatible groupings and have identi- 
fied such integration problems, the next very important, 
and often neglected, step is to properly document these 
pros and cons about each systems concept. 
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I do not mean to imply that every system studied will 
necessarily meet the original mission objectives. At this 
point I should state the responsibilities of the study 
leader. First of all, he has a responsibility to make 
sure that the people who have participated in this study 
haj7e provided an unbiased report on the various alter- 
nate subsystems considered. By this I mean, he must be 
aware of the various margins in the design (performance 
margins, reliability margins, etc.) so that the study he 
has presented is a balanced result in terms of bringing the 
whole system up to the same point of development. But 
conversely, if this has been done, and the study leader 
finds that the mission objectives cannot be met, he then 
has an obligation and responsibility to these very same 
people. He must be prepared to go back to the origi- 
nators of the study and frankly tell them that the mission 
that they have selected does not appear to be feasible, or 
at least not feasible within the constraints and boundary 
conditions that were placed upon the study. I think that 
both of these responsibilities are a matter of engineering 
integrity: first, to see that you get the best possible effort 
from the people who have initiated the study; second, to 
properly represent the results of the combined efforts 
of the participating people. 
I would now like to give you several examples of dif- 
ferent types of studies which we have performed at JPL. 
My first example is of a study which we performed at 
the Laboratory about a year and a half ago. This is about 
as broad a study effort as one could imagine. Its title is: 
“Study of Several Apollo-Support Aspects of the Un- 
manned Lunar Program.” What this means is: In what 
areas and in what way can the unmanned lunar program 
make a contribution to the Apollo (or manned lunar) 
effort? 
We began this study quickly and came to the conclu- 
sion that there were three general areas in which the un- 
manned lunar program could potentially support the 
Apollo program. The first of these would be measuring 
environmental parameters which would aid in the design 
of the Apollo spacecraft and Apollo mission. The second 
major area of possible support would be the develop- 
ment and/or demonstration of techniques which may 
be required by the Apollo mission and spacecraft. And 
the third major area would be the actual flight test of 
Apollo equipment on unmanned lunar spacecraft. For 
the purposes of my example, I would just like to concen- 
trate on the study technique and the result of our attempt 
to answer only the first question: What measurements of 
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environmental parameters could be performed in support 
of the Apollo program? 
The first task we found we had to do was to define the 
Apollo mission and mission profile so that we could 
better understand the particular requirements of the mis- 
sion. I am sure that most of you are familiar with the 
mission profile/flight sequence (Fig. 5). The Apollo 
spacecraft will be launched from the Earth and placed 
into a coasting or parking orbit. This coasting period will 
allow an adjustment for any small deviations from the 
original launch conditions so that proper injection condi- 
tions may be achieved at  the conclusion of the burning 
of the last stage. With the completion of this final burn- 
ing of the booster rocket, the spacecraft would then be 
on a coasting trajectory to the vicinity of the Moon. Fol- 
lowing injection, there would be a period of ground- 
based tracking to determine the actual trajectory of the 
spacecraft as compared to the desired trajectory. If re- 
quired, a midcourse maneuver would be performed in 
transit to the Moon to correct for any deviations from 
the normal flight path. As the near vicinity of the Moon 
is approached, the astronauts will orient and fire a retro- 
rocket which brakes the spacecraft, slowing its velocity 
so that it will orbit about the Moon. Once in orbit, it 
may be necessary to perform a trim or corrective maneu- 
ver to adjust the orbit so that it passes over the desired 
landing point on the lunar surface. When proper orbit 
has been achieved, the astronauts will then separate the 
LEM (or Lunar Excursion Module), which is being built 
by Grumman. Two astronauts will then descend to the 
surface of the Moon in the LEM by firing a landing 
retrorocket and landing on the surface of the Moon. The 
third astronaut will remain behind in the orbiting portion 
of the spacecraft. With the completion of operations on 
the lunar surface and final checks on the LEM, the men 
will take off from the lunar surface under rocket power 
and rendezvous with the spacecraft, which will have re- 
mained in lunar orbit during this period. With the com- 
pletion of the rendezvous operation, the men transfer 
back to the spacecraft. The empty LEM is then separated 
and left in lunar orbit. There is a period of rocket firing 
which puts the command module and the service module 
onto a trajectory which will return it to the near vicinity 
of the Earth. As was the case on the outbound flight, it 
may be again necessary, after a period of tracking, to 
perform another midcourse maneuver to correct for any 
errors associated with the departure from lunar orbit. 
The Earth’s atmosphere will be entered on a grazing 
trajectory. The excess energy will be dissipated by use 
of atmospheric braking, and in a manner similar to Mer- 
cury’s reentry, the spacecraft will return to the surface 
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of the Earth. This, then, represents the nominal flight 
profile which Apollo will follow. The question is: how 
does one go about deciding, in a study sense, what kind 
of information on the various environments is needed, 
and how can these parameters be measured from un- 
manned spacecraft? 
The first step of the study, as we performed it, was to 
generate a matrix as illustrated in Fig. 6. Down the left- 
hand column, as row headings, we listed the various 
steps in the Apollo mission profile as just discussed. In 
this listing, we went into considerably more detail than 
I have had time to discuss with you today. Then we 
listed across the top, as column headings, every environ- 
mental parameter that would be experienced. For con- 
venience, we grouped these parameters into the various 
regimes shown here. That is, the near-Earth environment, 
the transit or translunar environment, the near-Moon 
environment such as would be experienced in lunar orbit, 
and the environmental parameters of the lunar surface. 
In so doing, we tried to list every known and potential 
environmental factor that might be experienced from 
near-Earth to the surface of the Moon and back. As you 
can imagine, this is a fairly long list, ranging all the way 
from Van Allen belt radiation near the Earth, to such 
details as whether or not there is dust on the surface of 
the Moon. Then, for every element in the matrix, we 
tried to answer the following three questions. First, is 
the particular environmental parameter in this column 
of consequence during a particular mission phase? We 
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Fig. 6. Environmental parameters: 
Apollo mission profile 
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tried to limit answers to a simple “yes,” “no,” or “possibly.” 
For those boxes in which the answer to question one was 
a “yes” or “possibly,” we then asked a second question. 
That is, what is the nature of the interaction between 
the environmental parameter and the particular mission 
phase that raises this question as to the interaction be- 
tween the two? Certainly one of the more obvious exam- 
ples is the effect of Van Allen belt radiation, both on 
different elements of the system and upon man himself. 
During the lunar landing, the surface roughness and its 
hardness are both extremely critical parameters and 
strongly influence the design of the landing system. 
Finally, once this interaction has been stated as clearly 
as possible, we then attempted to answer the third ques- 
tion: What information is required to aid in the design? 
That is, is the current knowledge of the parameter suffi- 
cient to allow for design, or is additional or more accurate 
information required to properly carry out the design 
effort? By going through this type of questioning, we 
were able to sort out, from the many possible measure- 
ments which could be made, those which appeared to be 
the most important and critical to the Apollo mission. As 
you may well imagine, there were many areas where it 
appeared that the information was sparse, or not as de- 
tailed as the engineer would like. Outstanding among 
these were the following five parameters. 
The first three I assume will be obvious; you could 
have probably written them down without going through 
all the work that we did. These are the parameters 
directly concerned with the physical characteristics of 
the surface of the Moon. They are extremely important 
because of their interaction with the landing system: the 
landing dynamics, the landing gear, etc. These parame- 
ters are: the surface roughness, the surface slopes, and 
the surface hardness or bearing strength. There are 
bounds placed on the ranges over which these parameters 
can vary. These bounds are, in general, based on the 
theories of the origin and evolution of the Moon. How- 
ever, it was found that the extremes which these theories 
encompass present an extremely difficult engineering 
problem if one attempts to design for the entire range. 
Indeed, there is a definite engineering reward if any of 
these bounds can be markedly changed or reduced. This 
is particularly true when one considers the high degree 
of reliability required of manned spaceflight efforts. 
The fourth parameter is the presence or absence of 
lunar surface dust. It appears on this list for two reasons: 
first, because of the landing problem, and, second, be- 
cause if the surface is dusty one would expect that a 
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rocket jet would kick up a large plume of dust which 
might obscure or hamper the use of visual or nonvisual 
sensors during landing, or, if the landing is successfully 
accomplished, the dust settling back on the spacecraft 
might cover such elements as sensors or solar panels. 
The fifth category concerns the value of the electro- 
magnetic properties of the ltinnr .m?@ce, part;cu!ar!j: at 
microwave frequencies. Most of our concepts indicated 
that some sort of radar would be used both as an altime- 
ter and as a velocity sensor during the landing and take- 
off phases of the mission. Hence, it is important to know 
the scattering and absorptive properties of the surface 
in the radar frequencies in order to allow the proper 
design of such instrumentation. If, in the final Apollo 
design, one uses visual sensors to provide this same infor- 
mation, then the analogous category would be for a 
better definition of the surface properties in the visual 
portion of the spectrum. 
There were actually two types of data sought for each 
of these five environmental parameters. The first of these 
might be called survey-type data; that is, information on 
these properties over a fairly wide area on the lunar sur- 
face. The purpose of such survey-type information would 
be to aid in the selection of the landing site. In perform- 
ing a survey, it may not be necessary to obtain informa- 
tion in all five categories or to obtain it with the same 
detail or accuracy required to verify the final landing 
site. Rather, it may be adequate to take data at a suffi- 
cient resolution so that unacceptable landing sites are 
eliminated from further surveys. For example, photo- 
graphic measurements, taken from such a spacecraft as a 
lunar orbiter, may be able to disqualify large portions of 
the lunar surface because of the extremes of surface 
roughness or surface slopes. Once we have weeded out 
the more obviously unacceptable sites, we must still 
gather detailed information on all five of the parameters 
at the selected landing site. This leads to the second type 
of data required to accomplish the Apollo mission; i.e., 
detailed landing site information. 
The next phase of the study was to review the capabili- 
ties we had or could bring into being to make the mea- 
surements of these parameters. To determine this we 
formed the elements of the second matrix illustrated in 
Fig. 7. Across the top we uscd the five environmental 
parameters and the two diffcrcnt typcs of data required 
as the ten column headings of the matrix. Then, down the 
left-hand column, as row headings, we tried to list all of 
the instrument/spacecraft combinations that were avail- 
able or could be built within the time scale of thc Apollo 
LANDING S I T E  DATA SURVEY DATA 
Fig. 7. Environmental parameters: instrument/ 
spacecraft combinations 
mission. This list ranged all the way from Earth-based 
measurements through measurements performed from 
sounding rockets, balloons, and Earth-orbiting spacecraft, 
lunar fly-by spacecraft, on to rough-landing spacecraft, 
orbiting spacecraft, soft-landing spacecraft, and down to 
roving vehicles placed on the lunar surface by a soft- 
landing spacecraft. Then, for each element in the matrix, 
we again asked several questions. The first of these was: 
can a measurement of the environmental parameter be 
performed with the particular combination of instrument 
and spacecraft? Again the answers were “yes,” “no,” and 
“possibly.” As an example, a soft-landing spacecraft may 
not be able to perform an area survey. For those particu- 
lar combinations for which we received an answer of 
yes, or possibly, we then asked the second question: with 
what accuracy can the measurement of the environmental 
parameter be performed, utilizing this instrument space- 
craft combination? We may find that certain combinations 
eliminate themselves because they do not have sufficient 
resolution or the requisite accuracy to provide adequate 
information. We then took this list of possibly attainable 
measurements accuracies and compared it to the pre- 
ceeding matrix listing the required accuracy. For those 
combinations that met the required accuracy, we then 
asked the third question: If there is more than one tech- 
nique available to us, which is preferable? That is, 
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one technique may measure a parameter directly, where- 
as the second technique may provide information on the 
same parameter, but do it in an indirect manner such 
that interpretation of the results is required. This inter- 
pretation of data may not be desired because of the un- 
certainty associated with it. 
This, then, illustrates two phases of a study conducted 
at the project level to try to describe the utility of space- 
craft systems in terms of measurements that could be 
performed. I don’t have sufficient time here to go into 
further detail on this particular study; however, we did 
investigate the other several areas of possible support, 
and developed, in addition to the description of mission 
capability, descriptions of the spacecraft themselves, their 
estimated probability of mission success, the schedule 
upon which they could be developed, and the cost of the 
individual firings. This information was made available 
to the Lunar Program Office at  JPL. As a result of that 
effort, we were asked to perform another study which 
I would like to describe to you now. 
We were asked to study in more detail how one could 
make a measure of lunar surface hardness, utilizing the 
particular capability of the Ranger spacecraft then under 
development at the JPL. For those of you who aren’t 
familiar with the Ranger spacecraft, I would like to de- 
scribe briefly what it looks like by using Fig. 8. It is an 
attitude-stabilized spacecraft, utilizing a three-axis refer- 
ence system. To maintain stability it uses nitrogen gas 
jets, controlled by error signals from optical sensors, to 
provide torques about the reference axes. The power 
for the spacecraft is provided from two solar panels 
covered with photovoltaic cells. They have an area of 
approximately 20 sq ft. When the spacecraft has stabi- 
lized, after separation from the boostcr vehicle, the longi- 
tudinal axis (termed the roll axis), is pointed at  the Sun 
by use of the board sensors, their on-board logic system, 
and gas jets. This action aligns the solar panels at right 
angles to the Sun so that they are fully illuminated and 
provide power. Once oriented towards the Sun, by using 
the degree of freedom provided by rolling the spacecraft 
about this roll axis, and by using the degree of freedom 
provided by the hinge in the high-gain antenna system, 
we are able to aim the directional high-gain antenna 
towards the Earth. Once we have attained two-way com- 
munication with Earth, we switch antennas and take ad- 
vantage of the higher bandwidths attainable with such a 
directional antenna. This particular order of establishing 
the reference was chosen for several reasons. Since the 
Earth is not as bright an object in the sky as the Sun, 
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we require a more sensitive seeker to determine its posi- 
tion. If this seeker would inadvertently “see” the Sun 
rather than the Earth, it would be permanently damaged. 
Secondly, by acquiring the Sun first, we are able to 
transfer from the on-board stored power (in the form of 
a battery) to the continuously available power from the 
solar panels themselves. Thus, we run into no risk of 
completely depleting our battery before the completion 
of the stabilization sequence. Throughout this period we 
are on a trajectory to the vicinity of the Moon. Under- 
neath the spacecraft, at the end opposite the one we can 
see in Fig. 8, is the midcourse motor. After a period of 
tracking, we are able to determine the errors associated 
with the boost phase of the trajectory. Since we have on 
board three gyroscopic references, we are able to com- 
mand turns about these reference axes. These turns align 
the thrust axis of the midcourse motor in the appropriate 
direction. We then fire the motor for a calculated period. 
By this technique, we can impart a known impulse, in a 
specified direction, to the mass of the spacecraft, thus 
placing it on a new trajectory. With the completion of 
this maneuver we go back through the acquisition of the 
Sun and Earth in the same manner described earlier and 
continue on the trajectory to the Moon. 
The other systems of the spacecraft are contained in 
the hexagonal structure. There are six compartments 
available for the packaging of the various modules and 
subsystems required to form the entire system. This par- 
ticular spacecraft had an additional design requirement, 
namely, that it should be capable of carrying a rough 
landing capsule, developed by Ford Aeronutronic Divis- 
ion, to the lunar surface. The capsule is shown in Fig 8. 
As we approach the vicinity of the Moon, we again 
command the spacecraft to align itself to a precalculated 
attitude, performing turns about its reference axes. This 
precalculated attitude is such that the spacecraft ap- 
proaches the Moon tail first, with its roll axis aligned to 
the velocity vector. In the case of this particular series 
of Rangers, the flight path chosen is such that the flight 
path and the velocity vector are coincident and vertical 
to the lunar surface at the point of impact; i.e., the space- 
craft is on a vertical, impacting trajectory. At a preset 
altitude, the radar altimeter will provide an ignition 
signal to the retromotor inside this structure. With the 
ignition of this retromotor, the motor and the capsule 
separate from the spacecraft, which itself continues on 
to impact on the surface of the Moon. The capsule sys- 
tem, weighing some 330 lb at ignition, decelerates from 
the initial velocity of some 9,000 ft/sec to the burnout, 
at which time it has slowed to just over 100 ft/sec. With 
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burnout of the retromotor, the retromotor itself is sepa- 
rated from the capsule. The capsule, weighing some 89 
lb, has a structure designed to absorb the residual kinetic 
and potential energy associated with the velocity and 
altitude at retromotor burnout. This structure is a sphere 
approximately 3 ft in diameter. The capsule has an outer 
balsa wood shell which is approximately 6 in. thick. This 
outer balsa wood shell protects the inner payload, which 
is about the size of a basketball and weighs 5657 lb. 
Balsa wood was chosen as a protective shell, since during 
tests we found that on a unit-weight basis, balsa wood 
had the best energy-absorption characteristics of any sub- 
stance that we could find. 
The balsa-encased inner payload falls to the lunar sur- 
face. The velocity at impact is comprised of the residual 
velocity at burnout, plus any velocities attributable to 
angular errors, plus the velocities associated with the 
potential energy at the burnout altitude. The balsa 
crushes upon impact, absorbing part of the energy. The 
IMPACT 
SPHERE 
1 TRANSDUCER 
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ball continues to bounce or may partially bury itself, 
coming to rest finally on the lunar surface. The shock 
associated with the impact is on the order of 3,000 Gs.  
That is the peak loading which the inner sphere, which 
is the payload of the entire spacecraft, must be de- 
signed to withstand. This inner sphere consists of the 
measuring instrument, its associated data encoding de- 
vices, a transmitter, the associated power supplies, and 
the thermal control devices. These subsystems are all 
contained in this basketball-sized sphere, weighing just 
under 60 lb, which must successfully pass a shock test 
of some 3,000 Gs. 
To return to the question we were asked to study: 
Using as much as possible of this already developed 
system, how could we perform a measurement of lunar 
surface hardness? In the following illustrations I will 
show some of the supporting advanced development re- 
quired to support the design study, which in this case 
was carried out by Aeronutronic for JPL. 
Fig. 9. Prototype accelerometer 
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Figure 9 illustrates an omnidirectional accelerometer. 
Actually, this device is about the size of a billiard ball. 
It consists of a hollow steel sphere, which is filled with 
fluid. We cap the ends of the cavity with pressure trans- 
ducers. The readings that these two transducers sense 
will depend upon the deceleration load to which the 
sphere is subjected and also on the angle at which it 
strikes the surface. However, by simply summing the two 
readings and dividing by 2, we get the average pressure 
in the center of the sphere, which is dependent only upon 
the deceleration forces. Thus, with this device we are 
able to measure the peak deceleration without being re- 
quired to know the impacting attitude of the device. 
SYSTEMS DESIGN 
Figure 10 illustrates some test results obtained while 
qualifying this accelerometer. The column to the left 
shows the response when the system has the two trans- 
ducers at right angles to the applied motion. The column 
to the right shows the response of the accelerometers 
when the pressure transducers are in line with the ap- 
plied motion. Figure 10 illustrates the input, the ideal 
output, and the actual output as measured. As you can 
see, it performs well. 
Figure 11 illustrates the design study in its final form. 
Illustrated is the new inner sphere resulting from the 
study. The sphere will replace that inner payload of some 
Fig. 11. SURMEC payload 
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60 lb we talked of earlier. It has been given the name of 
SURMEC, standing for Surface Measurement Capsule. 
It is shown here in an artist’s conception as it would 
appear on the lunar surface. In the cavities shown, we 
carry a number of the omnidirectional accelerometers 
which I described earlier. To allow these spheres to be 
tossed by springs to the lunar surface, we developed a 
method to blow off the outer balsa wood shell. The shell 
is shown fragmented. When the outer shell is blown off, 
the accelerometer balls-trailing wires-are ejected by 
springs. These wires transmit back the information con- 
ccrning the characteristics of the impact as sensed by the 
pressure transducers. We found, in the course of the study, 
that we could actually carry seven of the accelerometer 
spheres. It was found highly desirable to keep one of 
them active during the initial landing impact of 3,000 G’s. 
We found that we were able to cover an area 1,OOO ft in 
radius by using appropriately sized springs, 1,000 ft being 
attainable, of course, because of the reduced gravitational 
field of the Moon. Thus with seven measurements over a 
circle of a radius of 1,000 f t  we could do a fairly good 
site survey with a single payload. 
Figure 12 illustrates some other areas of supporting 
advanced development that were investigated. It shows 
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the tests to remove the outer balsa wood covering. To 
the left, we have the hemisphere of balsa wood. To the 
right the balsa wood impact limiter has been removed, 
using primer cord laid right at  the surface of the balsa 
shell and the inner sphere. I think that Figs. 9 and 12 
indicate the point I tried to make earlier: that to take 
a study from the practicable phase to a practical phase, 
one must do supporting development work. In the earlier 
SURMEC CAN RETURN LUNAR SURFACE CHARACTERISTICS 
7 DISPERSED STRENGTH SAMPLES 
SUBSURFACE STRUCTURE DATA FROM GEOPHONE 
DUST LAYER DEPTH FROM PENETROMETER 
FEASIBILITY OF TECHNIQUES DEMONSTRATED 
FIRST FLIGHT IN  I I  MONTHS 
A HIGH-CONFIDENCE, MINIMUM-COST, AND TIMELY UTILIZATION 
OF RANGER TO SUPPORT APOLLO DESIGN 
Fig. 13. SURMEC summary -- 
Fig. 12. Impact limiter segment removal test 
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study, the one concerning the support to Apollo by un- 
manned lunar spacecraft, we had classed this system as 
being potentially possible. I have shown only two of the 
areas where development work was done so that we 
could convert this initial concept into a practical design. 
Figure 13 gives a rather terse summary of the study 
effort. I didn’t discuss all of these factors. We found that 
in addition to surface hardness measurements it might be 
possible to cany a geophone which would, by listening to 
SYSTEMS DESIGN 
the impact of these spheres on the surface, give us some 
idea of the subsurface structure. We could also carry a 
penetrometer to attempt to measure the hardness by 
a completely different technique. As you see we felt that 
with the supporting development work we performed we 
had demonstrated the feasibility of the techniques in- 
volved. With these demonstrations and consideration of 
the rest of the system, we felt that it would be possible 
to attempt a first flight in just under a year, in about 
11 months. 
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Systems Analysis 
C. R. GATES 
Chief, Systems Division 
The purpose of this discussion is to explain and de- 
scribe the technology of systems analysis and to show 
how systems analysis contributes to the design and flight 
of lunar and planetary spacecraft. The discussion is in 
two parts: (1) a general definition, and (2) an explanation 
utilizing a specific example. 
Modern spacecraft require that a diversity of tech- 
nologies be synthesized into a completely integrated 
spacecraft (Fig. 1). Our modern technology requires 
specialists in the diverse areas who generally devote their 
entire professional lives to one of these disciplines. In 
order to yield a functioning spacecraft which will ac- 
complish a dcsired mission, a new technology known as 
“systems engineering” has evolved. Thus, at JPL we have 
a Systems Division as well as a Guidance and Control 
Division, a Propulsion Division, etc. 
Gu~$!!~ofND COMMUNICATIONS STRUCTURE POWER SCIENCE  
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Fig. 1. Systems engineering 
In Fig. 1, the box labeled “Systems Design and Devel- 
opment” shows the main stream of activity for a given 
spacecraft project. Most of the activities here involve 
balances and tradeoffs between the various subsystems. 
For example, how should weight and power be allocated 
among the various subsystems? A typical problem would 
be the choice of the gain of the spacecraft antenna; a 
higher gain antenna yields a stronger signal at the Earth, 
but it also requires a larger antenna and/or a higher 
frequency for the R F  signal, and demands that the space- 
craft be stabilized more accurately. Other tradeoffs would 
involve the allocation of weight and power to additional 
scientific instruments versus the use of that weight and 
power to accomplish other functions more reliably. 
In order to accomplish these tradeoffs and balances, 
it is necessary that a mathematical model of the space- 
craft be constructed and analyzed. In this activity, which 
is known as “systems analysis,” the subsystems are usually 
considered as black boxes and are treated in terms of 
their input-output characteristics. The results of these 
analyses are fed into the systems design activity. 
If we were designing a washing machine or a television 
set, the activity which I have called systems analysis, 
namely, the construction and analysis of mathematical 
models, would certainly take place; however, in these 
cases systems analysis would probably not be separated 
from the systems design and given a distinct identity. But 
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for a spacecraft we have an additional problem, that of 
the selection and description of the flight path; and since 
each subsystem is highly sensitive to the characteristics 
of this flight path, a preponderance of our activities in 
systems analysis is concerned in some way or other with 
the trajectory. 
A final point of interest in our discussion of systems 
eiigiiieering and systems analysis is to note the sharp 
demarcation which is usually made between project work 
-that is, work devoted to a specific spacecraft on a spe- 
cific time scale for a specific mission-and technological 
work devoted to determining how to design spacecraft 
or to determining better methods for spacecraft design. 
As noted earlier, the spacecraft and its subsystems are 
quite sensitive to the characteristics of the trajectory. For 
example, the distance of the spacecraft from Earth di- 
rectly affects the communication system, and the distance 
of the spacecraft from the Sun (and whether it is in light 
or shadow) affects the temperature control system. 
A typical spacecraft may use the Sun for one attitude 
reference as well as for gathering power; it may use a star 
for another attitude reference. It must communicate with 
the Earth and hence, generally, must point an antenna 
toward the Earth; and it must point scientific instruments 
at some other body of interest, e.g., the Moon or Mars. 
Consequently, the spacecraft sprouts hinges, gimbals, 
and other miscellaneous joints so as to point itself in a 
number of directions simultaneously, and since the rela- 
tive geometry between these various bodies is dependent 
on a trajectory, the trajectory again is of great conse- 
quence. 
In practice we may find that there exists a continuum 
of trajectories for a given mission, and our task is to 
select that trajectory or set of trajectories which does the 
best job. Trajectories may vary greatly in their sensitivity 
to guidance errors, and since for lunar and planetary 
spacecraft we wish to bring the spacecraft into some 
specific proximity in relationship to the target body, the 
accuracy with which the trajectory can be controlled 
by guidance is of great interest. 
It should be noted here that systems analysis for space 
flight, with its heavy dependence on the trajectory, has 
developed as a field of technology in concurrence with 
the technology of modern high-speed digital computers. 
Most of the analyses which we do for our space missions 
would not be possible without the modern digital com- 
puter. 
A brief comment on the relationship between space 
flight systems analysis and classical celestial mechanics 
might be of interest here. As you know, celestial mechan- 
ics is the oldest science (although not the oldest profes- 
sion), dating back to the beginning of recorded history. 
The objective of classical celestial mechanics has been 
to describe accurately the motion of the planets-to give 
descriptiws which would be gwd over iarge time inter- 
vals of the circular motion of the planets. The central 
problem in mathematical analysis in celestial mechanics 
has been to find approximate solutions to the “Sbody” or 
“n-body” problem. For the Moon, say, the problem would 
be to describe the motion of the Moon in the presence of 
both the Sun and the Earth. Since no solution exists in 
close form, approximations, generally in the form of 
series, are used. 
For lunar and planetary spacecraft flights, cyclical 
motion is generally not of interest. Also, the problem of 
controlling spacecraft flight by means of various maneu- 
vers is present. Thus, while both classical celestial me- 
chanics and space flight analysis use Newton’s laws, the 
methods and procedures used tend to differ greatly. 
We proceed to an example which illustrates the nature 
of the problems in systems and trajectory analysis. We 
will show the interrelationships between trajectory analy- 
sis and the various subsystems of the spacecraft-inter- 
relationships involving subsystem transfer functions and 
input/output characteristics-and how they are gathered 
into a single technology with emphasis on trajectories. 
The first example deals with the design of a trajectory 
for a lunar mission. (Here, design means selecting-out 
of the continuum of trajectories-that trajectory which 
best accomplishes what is desired. Design is often selec- 
tion; in this case, it is wholly selection.) A partial list of 
constraints confronting the designer of lunar trajectory 
would contain the following: 
1. Launch from Cape Canaveral. 
2. Range safety. 
3. Preinjection tracking. 
4. Postinjection tracking. 
5. Earth-probe-Sun angle, 90 245 deg. 
6. Vertical landing in lighted area. 
7. High payload weight. 
8. High accuracy. 
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The first item on the list is, of course, obvious, and it 
is a strong constraint. The second item is less obvious 
but just as real, because Range Safety prohibits flight 
over Cuba and Africa. This prohibition limits the trajec- 
tories out of the Cape to a narrow band down the middle 
of the Atlantic, between Africa and South America. 
In the listed tracking constraints, “injection” simply 
means the time at  which the boost vehicle drops away 
and the spacecraft is separated and coasting. During 
preinjection, in order to receive telemetry data from the 
boost vehicle and to track it, the flight path must be 
within range of various tracking stations. We must 
choose, then, a trajectory which can be tracked by exist- 
ing stations of the Atlantic Missile Range. Similarly, dur- 
ing postinjection, tracking and telemetry considerations 
impose strong trajectory constraints. 
For this hypothetical mission, the Earth-probe-Sun 
angle must be between 45 and 135 (90 k45)  deg. The 
reason for this is that the Sun and the Earth will be used 
as attitude references. The angle subtended at the space- 
craft between the two references must be in a 90-deg 
range in order to keep the servosystem stable. 
Since this is a lunar flight we now must consider the 
motion of the Moon relative to the Earth. Figure 2 illus- 
trates this motion. It is a view looking down on the top 
of a celestial sphere, in which the Z axis, pointing straight 
Fig. 2. Earth-Moon geometry 
up, is the pole of the ecliptic; it is the vector which is 
normal to the ecliptic plane. The ecliptic plane is, of 
course, that plane which the Earth describes in its motion 
around the Sun. The reference system is the ecliptic 
plane. The pole of the Moon, that is to say the axis of 
rotation of the Moon, is inclined 1% deg with respect 
to the ecliptic pole. The pole of the Moon’s plane-that 
is, the vector which is perpendicular to the plane of mo- 
tion of the Moon-is 5 deg away from the ecliptic pole, 
and these two poles rotate so that they are the ends of 
a line which rotates around Z once approximately every 
19 years. The reason for this is the simultaneous influence 
of the Sun on the Earth and on the Moon. 
As we know, the Earth’s pole is inclined approximately 
231/2 deg from the ecliptic pole. For our purposes we 
can consider it to be fixed. The angle alpha between the 
normal to the Moon’s plane and the Earth’s pole is of im- 
portance to us; it fluctuates over the 19-year cycle. NOW, 
the angle between the Earth’s pole and the pole of the 
Moon’s plane equals the angle between the equator of 
the Earth and the plane of motion of the Moon; if this 
angle is at its maximum-281/2 deg-then the latitude of 
the Moon with respect to the Earth will fluctuate over a 
monthly cycle from +28$ deg to -28% deg. 
Figure 3, which shows how lighting constraints would 
affect the choice of trajectory, is a Earth-centered pic- 
ture, looking down on the motion, with the Sun at the 
bottom. The Moon is shown in four different phases, and 
the four points of vertical impact of probes launched 
from the Earth are indicated by arrows. It can be seen 
that, for vertical trajectories, these points of impact tend 
to occur on the so-called leading edge of the Moon. 
Figure 3 illustrates four possible lunar-impact situa- 
tions. In Case 1, impact would occur in a lighted area, 
but the angle subtended at the spacecraft between the 
Earth and the Sun would be approximately zero, which 
is unsatisfactory. In Cases 2 and 3, impact would occur 
in darkness. So Case 4-impact during the Moon’s third 
quarter-presents the only acceptable impact situation. 
Impact in Case 4 occurs in the light, and the angle sub- 
tended at the spacecraft between the Earth and the Sun 
is 90 deg. In practice, for a number of reasons, the arc 
shown represents the range of permissible phases of the 
Moon during which we can fire. 
We find, then, that for any month we are constrained 
to a period of about four or five days during which we 
can launch to encounter the Moon. 
35 
JPL SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS 
GATES 
I 
J 
E 
--w 
Fig. 3. lighting constraints 
Figure 4, an Earth-centered picture, shows the trajec- 
tory in the place of motion of the spacecraft. Normally, 
for the type of trajectory which is of interest, we will 
encounter the Moon at an angle of about 10 deg, in 
reference to the Earth, prior to apogee. The attraction 
of the Moon is fairly weak relative to the Earth; and for 
the purposes of this discussion we will assume that the 
Moon has no mass. 
I t  is apparent from Fig 4 that we have a range of 
possible injection points. However, if we inject at, say, 
point Q, the angle of injection, that is, the angle that the 
injection velocity vector makes with the local vertical, 
is steep. If we inject at perigee, the angle between the 
local vertical, the radius vector, and the velocity vector 
is 90 deg. It is desirable to inject at the perigee point 
rather than at some point where the velocity vector of 
the spacecraft would not be horizontal. If we inject 
either up or down from horizontal it requires more en- 
ergy and we obtain less spacecraft weight. 
Figure 5 is geocentric, nonrotating, showing the equa- 
tor of the Earth, the North Pole of the Earth, Cape Ca- 
naveral, the latitude line pertaining to the Cape, and the 
latitude corresponding to the so-called sublunar point. 
Fig. 4. Spacecraft trajectories 
Fig. 5. Geocentric trajectories 
The sublunar point is the other end of the line connecting 
the center of Earth and the Moon projected through the 
other side of the Earth. 
Since this is a geocentric, nonrotating figure, the Moon 
will appear to the observer to be moving in the direction 
shown. 
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The flight path of the launch vehicle must be a great 
circle which connects the Cape and the sublunar point. 
If we launch at such a time that the Moon-or, more 
precisely, the sublunar point-is at MI, and if injection 
occurs near perigee, then we will encounter the Moon 
satisfactorily. But if we launch at a certain time later, 
such that the Moon or the sublunar point has progressed, 
owing to the Earth's rotation, to M , ,  our flight path then 
is totally different; we have to follow the Moon as it 
were. We therefore find that the trajectory is a function 
of the launch time. In practice, we are able to launch on 
azimuth-azimuth being the angle measured clockwise 
from north, between about 90 and 114 deg out of the 
Cape-and this will correspond to a time interval some- 
where between 1 and 3 hours. 
In summary, we find that we can launch during a 
period of about four to six days per month and during a 
certain phase of the Moon. Similarly, during any one 
given day, we will be able to launch during some launch 
window, which corresponds to the time that it takes for 
the Moon to traverse the distance which corresponds to 
launches between 90 and 114 deg. The launch window 
varies with launch date, since if the declination of the 
Moon is such that the sublunar point is north, then it will 
take the Moon a shorter time to traverse arc MI than it 
will to traverse arc M,.  Therefore, when the sublunar 
point is as far south as possible, the launch windows are 
long, and when the sublunar point is as far north as 
it ever gets, the launch windows are short. 
The planetary spacecraft launch problem is very simi- 
lar to the lunar spacecraft launch problem. For the plan- 
ets, we obtain a launch opportunity every synodic period 
-the synodic period being the period corresponding to 
the beat frequency between the period of the Earth and 
the period of the target planet. Every 1.6 years we will 
be in the right geometric opportunity to launch to Venus, 
and for Mars it is about every 2.1 years. That means that 
we get an opportunity to launch to Mars in late 1964, 
but we do not get another opportunity until late 1966. 
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Space Flight Operations 
MARSHALL JOHNSON 
Chief, Space Flight Operations Section 
The category of functions known as space flight op- 
erations is a difficult subject to discuss and explain. It 
is a relatively new area, and the terminology associated 
with it is not widely understood. However, the following 
definition may be helpful: 
Space flight operations are those operations nec- 
essary in order to obtain and process spacecraft 
information and commands required during that 
portion of flight from launch to mission ac- 
complished. 
To draw an analogy, space flight operations can be de- 
scribed in terms of conventional airplane flight, in the 
sense that an airplane takes off and certain things happen 
to it while it is in flight; flight operations are those events 
that take place after the plane is airborne. 
Although the analogy between flight operations and 
space flight operations is close, there are differences. For 
example, space vehicles are not yet very reliable, and in 
the sense that the related technologies are not fully de- 
veloped, they are not well understood. This fact has been 
demonstrated by the difficulties that we have encoun- 
tered in the Ranger mission series. Furthermore, space- 
craft cost is substantial, and spacecraft manufacture 
involves a long lead time. We can’t build 100 spacecraft, 
because the cost would be prohibitive. If we could af- 
ford 100 spacecraft, we couldn’t launch them, because 
our present rate of manufacture and launch is about 1 
spacecraft every 2 months. We are fund-limited with 
respect to the number of spacecraft we can build, and we 
are time-limited with respect to the rate at which we can 
build them. 
The vehicles that we launch are unlike military ballis- 
tic missiles. They are not simply dead weights or con- 
tainers for explosives. They are active devices. They re- 
act to the different environments through which they 
pass, and they react to commands from the Earth. These 
vehicles are sent off into space to accomplish scientific 
experiments; they are flying laboratories. 
As noted, because of the state of our technology and 
the problems of funding, manufacturing and launching, 
we cannot afford to launch these space vehicles in rapid- 
fire fashion. Between shots we must analyze the results 
of each launch. We have to try to determine whether 
the vehicle functioned as it was designed to function. If 
it didn’t, we have to find out why, so that we can make 
corrections in future flights. If we make mistakes, we 
have to try to discover what they are. The end object is 
to build vehicles that will do the scientific jobs with a 
minimum of error and a maximum of reliability. 
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In some cases, we have been successful at this; in others 
we haven’t. The recent Mariner flight to Venus was suc- 
cessful. The spacecraft got there; it worked, but not ex- 
actly as designed. It could have worked better, and we 
are not certain why it didn’t. In some of the missions in 
the Ranger lunar series the spacecraft functioned prop- 
erly, but the launch vehicle didn’t. In other missions, the 
spacecraft didn’t function properly, and we don’t know 
why. It is not possible to instrument a payload for every 
possible environmental problem on a system with more 
than lo* components. The questions and problems posed 
by these flights are central to our subject-space flight 
operations-the events that take place between space- 
craft launch and mission accomplished. I will attempt 
to describe what these operations encompass, what they 
entail, the degree of effort we devote to them, and how 
and where they are conducted. 
It is necessary, here, to point out that there is a lack 
of technology relative to space flight operations. There 
are no archives or libraries of technical information upon 
which to draw; there are no textbooks. No degrees are 
given in this area. Here, there is no way to learn other 
than through experience, thought, and planning. The 
technology is being developed as we go along. Although 
we have made mistakes and will make more, we are try- 
ing to keep the cost of development minimal. 
As with all new technologies or new areas of investiga- 
tion there is a problem of semantics. You have experienced 
this in your academic studies. The various disciplines 
employ different terminologies to describe common sub- 
ject matter. At this point, I want to introduce and define 
some space flight operations terminology. 
To begin with, in our work the Space Flight Operations 
Complex is a real world; it is the physical plant in which 
space flight operations are conducted. The Space Flight 
Operations Complex includes a number of tracking sites 
upon which are located large radio antennas designed to 
communicate with our spacecraft at extremely long dis- 
tances-on the order of 100,000,000 miles. Collectively, 
these sites are called the Deep Space Instrumentation 
Facility, DSIF. 
The primary function of the DSIF tracking sites is 
data acquisition. They do only a minimal amount of data 
reduction, interpretation, and analysis required for their 
own operation. 
From the spacecraft, the tracking sites obtain two gen- 
eral types of data-telemetry data and tracking data. The 
telemetry data is generated in space by spacecraft instru- 
mentation. It originates in the spacecraft and is transmit- 
ted through a spacecraft communications system back to 
Earth, the DSIF tracking sites being Earth-based receiv- 
ers for the acquisition of the data. Telemetry data yields 
information about the spacecraft and the environment 
through which it is passing. 
Tracking data, on the other hand, is used to measure 
spacecraft direction, velocity, and range and is derived 
from a spacecraft-mounted transmitter or an Earth-based 
transmitter. There are two general types of radio fre- 
quency tracking data-one-way doppler and two-way 
doppler. One-way doppler consists of a signal transmitted 
from the spacecraft to Earth, where it is received and 
measured. Two-way doppler, which is highly accurate 
and generally more useful than one-way doppler, con- 
sists of an Earth-generated signal which is transmitted to 
the spacecraft, received by the spacecraft, converted by 
a transponder, and retransmitted back to Earth. 
The Space Flight Operations Facility is another ele- 
ment of the Complex. I t  is a building which serves as 
the focal point of the Complex. As such it serves as the 
gathering point for the data acquired by the tracking 
sites, as the physical plant in which this data is processed 
and reduced, and as a laboratory in which engineers and 
scientists can analyze, evaluate, and interpret the data in 
order to determine what the spacecraft is doing (in 
the sense of performance), what the scientific experi- 
ments are measuring, and where the spacecraft is going. 
During the launch phase of any mission, the space 
vehicle is subjected to what may be the most severe 
environment of the flight. The launch site and launch site 
facilities constitute a critically important third element of 
the Space Flight Operations Complex. Our vehicles are 
launched from the Atlantic Missile Range, although there 
are other launching sites-the Pacific Missile Range, for 
example, and White Sands, New Mexico. 
The various operations and functions of launch site, 
Space Flight Operations Facility, and Deep Space In- 
strumentation Facility are, of course, interrelated and 
complementary . 
There is no single point on Earth from which a space- 
craft can be monitored and controlled directly. The na- 
ture of planetary and spacecraft orbits and trajectories 
precludes this possibility. Therefore, our tracking sites, 
the prime points of data acquisition, are strategically 10- 
cated around the globe-at Johannesburg, South Africa; 
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Woomera, Australia; and Goldstone, California. Because 
of the locations of the tracking sites and the various other 
parts of the Complex are so widely divergent, the services 
of a fourth vital element of the Complex are required- 
namely, communications facilities, which link the parts 
together and integrate and unify the over-all operation. 
Another element of the Complex-Spacecraft Checkout 
Facilities-is responsible for checking out the spacecraft 
and for determining, before the start of operations, that 
there is a good probability that the craft will perform as 
designed. Here, also, personnel are trained; they are 
familiarized with mission details, with specific spacecraft 
capabilities, with the types of data to be obtained, and 
so forth. 
In order to explain more clearly the function of the 
Space Flight Operations Complex it is helpful to make 
a more or less arbitrary yet realistic distinction in order 
to categorize the various duties and tasks and functions 
that support the over-all operation. This distinction is 
between mission-independent, facility-oriented (or opera- 
tional), functions and mission-dependent, project-oriented 
(or technical), functions. 
And the distinction is a natural one to make. Some 
facilities or functions can be utilized in any type of space 
mission-not just in lunar missions, or planetary missions, 
or manned space missions, but in any type of mission. 
For example, a tracking antenna can track any kind of 
space vehicle that carries a transponder. A computer can 
process any kind of data. It doesn’t make any difference 
whether it is data acquired from a spacecraft or derived 
from accounting information or paychecks. On the other 
hand, the analysis of the data (to get the meaning out 
of it), and the interpretation of the data (to understand 
it), and the evaluation of the data (to determine what 
the spacecraft is doing) are functions that vary with 
each spacecraft. The people who analyze, interpret, and 
evaluate data are performing mission-dependent func- 
tions, whereas the people who operate antennas, com- 
puters, communications facilities and other such elements 
of the Complex are performing mission-independent 
functions. Mission-dependent functions we call technical 
functions; mission-independent functions we call opera- 
tional functions. 
In the prelaunch period, both technical personnel and 
operational personnel are trained, In Spacecraft Check- 
out Facilities we have a spacecraft. It can be used to 
simulate data that is expected to be obtained during 
flight. The data can then be passed through the ground- 
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based facilities that will handle it after launch in order 
to ensure data-facility compatibility. This can be done 
irrespective of the content of the data. It doesn’t make 
any difference what the data means so long as a simula- 
tion is made of what is to be expected after launch. 
Technical personnel, on the other hand, are concerned 
with data content, with data meaning. In the early days 
of our space effort-before we had access to such refine- 
ments as a Spacecraft Checkout Facility-our engineers 
and scientists were faced with problems based on un- 
available empirical information. That is, the people who 
were asked to describe the performance of the spacecraft 
-where it was going and what the experiments were do- 
ing-were not able to see the sort of data they had to 
deal with until after vehicle launch. As a result we spent 
most of our time determining what the data meant rather 
than what the content of the data was. 
To sum up, then, the principal elements of the Space 
Flight Operations Complex-DSIF, SFOF, Launch Site, 
Communications Facilities, Spacecraft Checkout Facili- 
ties-are ground based and, except for Spacecraft Check- 
out Facilities, are mainly employed after launch of the 
spacecraft. The basic functions-technical and operation- 
al-are performed in all the various elements of the Com- 
plex: technical functions being those associated with such 
relatively mission-dependent activities as analysis and 
evaluation of data acquired from a particular spacecraft; 
operational functions being those associated with such 
mission-independent activities as servicing spacecraft and 
operating the equipment used in acquiring and process- 
ing data. 
At  this point, in order to relate the activities of the 
Space Flight Operations Complex to the actual spacecraft 
flight, it will be instructive to explain-in an elementary 
fashion-some of the mechanics of our space effort. To 
begin with, at JPL we are primarily concerned with two 
classes of unmanned missions-lunar and planetary. These 
two classes of missions have opposing characteristics and 
common characteritics. The distinctions between the mis- 
sions are most apparent, of course, in the area of space- 
craft design, which has been discussed previously in this 
seminar. But common to both classes of missions is the 
basic two-stage vehicle-consisting of a booster and a 
second stage-which propels our spacecraft into orbit. 
Figure 1 illustrates the sequential elements of space- 
craft vehicle flight. During the first phase-the booster 
burn phase-the vehicle is picking up velocity, moving 
off the surface of the Earth. When the booster burns out, 
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Fig. 1. Spacecraft flight sequence 
the vehicle is still not in orbit-satellite orbit or space 
orbit. Before orbit can be achieved, the vehicle needs 
additional velocity or energy, and this it gets from the 
second stage. 
Conceptually, there are two types of trajectories- 
parking-orbit trajectories and direct-ascent trajectories. 
The distinction between them is very simple. The parking- 
orbit trajectory is one in which the second stage and the 
spacecraft are put into an Earth-sateIlite orbit before 
the spacecraft is injected into a transfer orbit toward the 
target body. The direct-ascent trajectory does not utilize 
a parking orbit; the spacecraft is injected directly into 
the transfer orbit. Since we are shooting from a moving 
platform toward a moving target, we can aim at more 
points on the target if we can vary the point from which 
we are shooting, and consequently we usually use parking- 
orbit trajectories. A direct-ascent trajectory is the special 
case of no coasting time for a parking orbit, and does not 
require a restart of the propulsion system. 
After the vehicle goes through the booster burn phase, 
the second stage lights up once. It burns for a given 
period of time, about 3 minutes. When it is shut off, the 
vehicle is in Earth-satellite orbit. This point, the point 
at which the engine is cut off, is called parking-orbit in- 
sertion or parking-orbit injection or satellite injection. 
Here, the vehicle is in a satellite orbit about the Earth. 
It remains there for a week or two weeks; then the orbit 
decays enough for the vehicle to re-enter the Earth’s at- 
mosphere. However, our objective is to get the vehicle 
off into a space trajectory, so we let it coast in this satel- 
lite orbit until it gets to the geocentric latitude and longi- 
tude from which it is to be launched at the target body. 
Just prior to the end of the coast period, at a known point 
calculable from theory, we allow sufficient time for the 
motor burning, and then reignite the second-stage. The 
second-stage motor has ignited twice now-first, to get 
the vehicle into satellite orbit; second to get it out of 
satellite orbit. At the conclusion of the second burn, the 
spacecraft is injected into a transfer trajectory which car- 
ries it toward the target body. This point is called space- 
craft injection or simply injection. 
Since &e secsiid stage is attached to the spacecraft aii 
this time, it obviously is going to follow the spacecraft 
unless something is done to change its course. At some 
time after injection, a maneuver or a retarding thrust is 
applied so that the second stage does not follow the 
spacecraft or bump it or affect some part of the space- 
craft system such as attitude control. Up to this point 
there is relatively little difference between a lunar and 
planetary mission or between a manned and an unman- 
ned mission. 
In order to relate the flight profile shown in Fig. 1 
to the activities and functions of the ground-based Space 
Flight Operations Complex, it should be noted that the 
period from launch to injection is a most critical period 
of spacecraft flight. If it could always be negotiated suc- 
cessfully by both the vehicle and spacecraft, the proba- 
bility of mission success would be high. For this reason 
the acquisition of spacecraft performance data during 
the launch-to-injection period is of considerable impor- 
tance to a space mission. However, obtaining data during 
launch to injection presents difficult problems. For ex- 
ample, the coast period in the parking orbit covers from 
2,000 to 10,000 miles of Earth surface; the parking orbit 
is at an altitude of only about 100 miles; and the space- 
craft overflies ocean areas. Therefore, the tracking sites 
can see the trajectory of the spacecraft for only a short 
period of time-perhaps 5 minutes per site. During this 
period the Space Flight Operations Complex must obtain 
data from a fast moving vehicle in a short period of time, 
and it must process, evaluate, and interpret the data so 
as to give reasonable assurance that the vehicle is func- 
tioning. 
After injection, space missions involve two additional 
critical phases. The first, the maneuver phase, is the 
period during which we are changing the course of the 
trajectory so that we can more precisely hit the point 
(planet or Moon) that we are aiming at. The second, the 
terminal phase, is the period just before the vehicle either 
passes or lands on the target body. 
Correct planetary missions are not designed to land or 
impact; they are designed so that the spacecraft will fly 
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Fig. 2. lunar mission phases 
past, encounter, the target. Lunar missions are designed 
to impact the target: sometimes in a hard landing, as in 
the Ranger series; other times in a soft landing so that 
equipment can be operated in a further phase, a post- 
landing phase. Figure 2 depicts these phases. 
In both lunar and planetary efforts, there is, of course, 
a time at which the mission is completed. But the space- 
craft is not worn out; it is not turned off; it is still func- 
tioning. The Mariner mission to Venus, for example, was 
terminated at the beginning of this year, 1963. But last 
night, six months after mission termination, the space- 
craft was coming back close to Earth, and we were 
listening for it. 
There is a marked difference in transit time, the time 
that it takes a spacecraft to go from injection point to 
destination, between lunar and planetary missions. Lunar 
missions take about 3 days and Venus and Mars planetary 
missions take from 5 to 9 months. 
An important consideration here is implied in the fact 
that during all critical phases of a mission-launch, ma- 
neuver, and terminal-spacecraft monitoring must be 
carried out continuously by engineers and scientists; if 
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a spacecraft fails, it is extremely important to pinpoint 
the cause and the exact time at  which the failure occurs. 
Since planetary missions last for several months, a very 
real problem arises in creating an environment in which 
personnel can carry out this type of protracted monitor- 
ing. In general, spacecraft performance and the types of 
measurements obtained are fairly predictable. We are 
looking for deviations in the data. 
A problem that we have run into in the past is that 
deviations are not always spotted. After watching the 
tedious sameness of undifferentiated data day after day 
for months, operator personnel can easily overlook a 
change when it does occur. When the event is finally 
noticed it may be too late to do anything about it. For 
remember, these operations are real-time operations, and 
our spacecraft are active mechanisms and are receptive 
to corrective action, if completed in time. 
The real-time nature of the more critical phases of a 
mission can perhaps be pointed up by an example of a 
lunar trajectory which is going to impact the Moon. In 
such a mission we may want to perform an experiment 
during the last 30 minutes before impact. To do this we 
must tell the spacecraft what to do; we must calibrate 
the instruments before the experiment starts; and we 
must start the experiment. If we start the experiment too 
early, the instruments won’t be calibrated properly, the 
life expectancy of the equipment may be exceeded, and 
the measurements may be lost. If we start too late, impact 
on the Moon will effectively end the problem. 
In the case of a planetary mission, the same situation 
is present in the encounter phase. The instruments are 
calibrated so that they will operate in only a small area 
near the planet, and we will lose the ability to make 
measurements unless we start the experiment at the right 
time. 
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Program Engineering and Project Problems 
JOHN SMALL 
Deputy Chief, Systems Division 
A subject that has interested me for some time is 
the relationship that exists between mission objectives, 
resources (money, manpower, facilities), and boundary 
conditions (schedule, performance, reliability). It is often 
in this area that mission success or failure is determined. 
When missions fail or projects are cancelled, the blame 
can always be laid at the manager’s door; but in my 
opinion, it often resides primarily with engineering per- 
sonnel. Engineering personnel are responsible for failures 
when they don’t point out inherent program problems 
or difficulties, or when they are concerned only with per- 
formance problems and ignore schedule, reliability and 
cost. 
Recently, Harvard University published a book en- 
titled The Weapons Acquisition Process’ which sets forth 
some classical information bearing on this problem. The 
author’s approach was to analyze a number of missile 
programs, including those of the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
and NASA, and to compare these selected programs on a 
‘Peck, M. J., and Scherer, F. M.,  The Weapons Acquisition 
Process: An Economic Analysis, Division of Research, Graduate 
School of Business, Harvard University, Boston, 1962. 
performance basis. Since the study was financed by the 
Ford Foundation, the authors are not subject to any pos- 
sible charges of favoritism. The study documents the his- 
tory of the missile business, and some of the information 
presented is startling. 
Table 1, which is reproduced from the above-mentioned 
book, gives the development cost factor and development 
time factor for twelve missile programs. It shows the 
relationship between estimated cost and actual cost and 
between estimated development time and actual develop- 
ment time Notice that the average actual cost was about 
three times as much as the estimated cost. 
Although the disparities shown throughout Table 1 
can be attributed to a number of causes, it is obvious 
that the various project engineers and managers sacri- 
ficed cost control in order to meet time schedules. Engi- 
neers are rather good at underestimating both cost and 
time requirements. And they are equally good at com- 
posing reasonable after-the-fact excuses blaming schedule 
dislocations on changed conditions and circumstances. 
However, effective preprogram analysis would decrease 
this sort of difficulty. 
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Table 1. Cost and time development factors 
for twelve missile programs 
Development 
cost factor Program 
~ 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
K 
L 
Average and 
standard development 
4.0 
3.5 
5.0 
2.0 
n.a. 
7.0 
3.0 
2.0 
2.4 
2.5 
0.7 
3.0 
3.2 k 1 . 2  
Development 
time factor 
1 .o 
2.3 
1.9 
n.0. 
0.7 
1 .E 
1.3 
1.0 . 
1.3 
1.3 
1 .o 
1.4 
1.36 +0.35 
A device showing the four elements that affect de- 
cision-making in this field might be called a parameter 
for project decisions and appear in equation form as: 
value (or performance) X reliability 
cost x time required 
P =  
A decision could involve, for example, a choice between 
using a component which cannot quite meet performance 
requirements-in which case, the requirements would 
have to be lowered-or developing a zew component 
which the vendor promises will meet the requirements. 
It might be interesting at this point to look at a formula 
worked out by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation as an 
aid in making decisions relative to bidding on proposals 
and contracts: 
probability of winning proposal 
X probability of mission success 
X probable profit 
P =  
cost of proposal 
It is a simple formula, but it is a good one, and in this 
area there are no textbooks for guidance. 
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Figure 1 shows the various support areas that are of 
critical importance in over-all spacecraft systems opera- 
tions and illustrates, from the standpoint of project man- 
agement, the complex nature of a spacecraft systems 
project organization. Besides the areas of general sup- 
port, such as spacecraft, space flight operations, launch 
vehicle, DSIF, there are specific jobs assigned to indi- 
viduals. For example, the Program Engineer, who is 
responsible for schedules and schedule coordination, 
rules on the number of items the various groups are al- 
lowed to build. If one group has responsibility for a 
particularly complex subsystem, it may be necessary to 
build more units in order to allow for sufficient testing. 
The decision is made by the Program Engineer. 
Spacecraft launch time is plotted versus energy capa- 
bility in Fig.2, which illustrates the sort of problems that 
might have to be handled by the Project Manager on the 
basis of logic, intuition, and experience. As shown in Fig. 
2, two types of trajectories are available. Type I ap- 
proaches a planet from the side nearest the Earth. Type 
0.41C 
0.362 
0.314 
0.262 
e 
0.21f 
0.17C 
0. I22 
0.0% 
NOTE: C3 IS TWICE THE TOTAL 
ENERGY/UNIT MASS WITH +- UNITS m2/sec2 X IO8 
+- 
TYPE I + 
5 2 
OCT NOV DEC JAN 
LAUNCH DATE 
Fig. 2. Minimum injection energy vs launch date 
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11 goes in and across the planet’s orbit and then ap- 
proaches the planet from the side away from the Earth. 
The two trajectories require different energy capabilities 
and flight times. The choice of trajectory and the choice 
of launch period are decisions that belong to the Project 
Manager; he has the data, and he makes his decisions 
on the basis of the data, and many people will disagree 
with him. 
Figure 3 shows, quite simply, the relationship between 
project cost and time. More particularly, it establishes the 
minimum time and minimum cost factors involved in 
this relationship. At present, most people in the space 
business try to accomplish their projects in minimum time 
because of competition from other contractors, But, of 
course, in order to obtain optimum reliability, it is often 
necessary to spend more time on a project. 
Figure 4, spacecraft costs versus spacecraft weight, 
presents data that I have been collecting for four or five 
years. Note that the ordinate represents flying pounds, 
the weight of the actual launched spacecraft exclusive 
of the cost of any redundant or backup craft. 
Explorer 1958, the first Earth satellite orbited by the 
United States, weighed 20 pounds and cost on the order 
of $30,000 per pound. The first U.S. deep space probe, 
]uno 2, 1959, which went out in space about as far as the 
Moon, weighed only 14 pounds and cost about $60,000 
per pound. Of course, the significance of the Fig. 4 curve 
TIME 
MINIMUM 
TIME I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
- I 
MINIMUM COST 
COST 
Fig. 3. Development possibility curve 
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Fig. 4. Spacecraft costs vs weight 
is that, as spacecraft weight goes up, cost per pound tends 
to go down. Increasing the reliability and probability of 
success of any spacecraft will tend to increase the costs. 
Besides the problems involved in costs, schedules, and 
reliability, most facilities now have manpower problems; 
there is a shortage of engineers. Consequently, in order 
to utilize available manpower and money with maximum 
effectiveness, it is implied that agencies involved in the 
space effort-particularly prime contractors who subcon- 
tract-must be able to estimate accurately the number of 
people required to accomplish a given project, and to 
make a decision relative to subcontracting part, or per- 
haps all, of the project. 
The curve in F i g 5  was devised to illustrate the prob- 
lem. The ordinate in Fig. 5 represents salaries, and the 
abscissa represents the ratio of procurement dollars to 
total funds. The zero point on the abscissa represents 
jobs that are carried out with no procurement support 
whatsoever; this is an unreal point today, as some sup- 
plies must be procured. The point at 1.0 is that point at 
which everything is done outside; the entire job is sub- 
contracted. Normally, however, on a subcontracted job, 
the prime contractor maintains a t  least a monitoring con- 
trol, and the prime contractor/subcontractor employee 
ratio would be perhaps 1 to 9. Relative to Fig. 5, that 
would mean operating in the area from 0.9 to 1.0. 
We have reviewed some of our projects and have found 
that the steepest point we have reached on the curve is 
at about $300,000 per employee. And that, of course, 
means not just engineers and scientists and project man- 
agers; it means every employee at  JPL. Most facilities 
engaged in the space effort have found, incidentally, that 
for every engineer or scientist, two employees are re- 
quired in the supporting jobs. 
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PROCUREMENT/TOTAL FUNDS 
Fig. 5. Dollars/man year vs procurement 
dollars/total dollars 
In order to relate some of this abstract material to 
space missions, it might be helpful to look at some mis- 
sion scheduling. Table 2 presents a six-year and seven- 
mission schedule, which is a good approximation of 
the type of schedules that we are using. Notice that the 
planetary shots are in groups of two and three. The rea- 
son for this is that the planets are in favorable tra- 
Mission 
lunar 
lunar 
lunar 
lunar 
Planetary 
Planetary 
Interplanetary 
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jectory position only at the times shown, and we want 
to use the launch opportunities to best advantage. This 
means, of course, that a manpower problem occurs 
around launch time. For lunar shots, on the other hand, 
we can fire monthly, during the third-quarter phase of 
the Moon when lighting and other factors are favorable. 
Perhaps four or five lunar shots represent the optimum 
scheduling for any one year. 
Table 3, which is based on the same scheduling given 
in Table 2, presents such related information as space- 
craft weight, number of flights per mission, over-all 
mission costs, and costs broken down for several fiscal 
years. Normally, mission costs estimated over the project 
lifetime will assume a truncated pyramid shape, as can 
be seen in the second lunar mission in Table 3; over a 
three-year period, costs are highest the second year. 
Table 3 shows, in addition to scheduled mission costs, 
costs of supporting research and technology. 
Having briefly discussed schedules and costs, I would 
like to continue on to the reliability factor. In this re- 
gard, Fig. 6 illustrates a much-argued subject, which is 
failure rate versus time. As shown in Fig. 6, design 
flaws appear early in testing; in temperature failures, 
for example, a component will work for a couple of 
hours and then exceed its temperature margin. On the 
other hand, wear-out failures, caused typically by simple 
erosion of material, generally occur much later. This 
shows the basic spacecraft problem; namely, how long 
should we test in order to eliminate the flaw failures 
but not get into the wear-out failures? 
Table 2. Mission schedule 
Calendar year 
1 2 6 
launches later 
than 1966 
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15 
35 
10 
Table 3. Spacecraft costs vs spacecraft weight 
1 1  
30 
5 
~ 
Mission 
4 
35 
20 
Overall costs Costs: fiscal years, $1,000,000 
Spocecroft 
weight, Ib 
No. of 
flights 
$1,000,000 1 
3 l 4  2 5 
7 
30 
30 
30 
40 
20 
lunar 
lunar 
Lunar 
lunar 
Planetary 
Planetary 
Planetary 
Interplanetary 
127 
48 
202 
216 
29 
139 
216 
101 
30 
i 3  
30 
1 
14 
17 
1 
35 
10 
45 
20 
750 
1200 
2400 
4500 
450 
1400 
3000 
1400 
15 
A 
12 
8 
4 
9 
8 
6 
66 
11% 
10 
7 
6 
16 
11 
9 
12 
157 
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Total 
Supporting research 
and technology 
1078 106 
29 44 1 48 
209 Total 65 135 
Computer and sequencer 
TV package 
Midcourse propulsion 
Thermal control and miscellaneous 
Cabling 
Pyrotechnics 
FLAW FAILURES W I- 
ED RARE OCCURRENCE FAILU a a 
W a 
3 
4 
i? 
TIME 
Fig. 6. Failure rate curve 
We attempt to determine, as a function of flight time, 
the failure modes of each subsystem part and, further, the 
probability of failure in each subsystem. From these 
determinations, we then estimate the probability of over- 
all mission success. Changes can be made to increase 
reliability, and solutions to problems can be appraised 
as to their effect on reliability. 
To understand the over-all system from a reliability 
standpoint, it is necessary to understand the various 
subsystems and the interactions among them. There- 
fore, as an aid to spacecraft system reliability analysis 
we use a spacecraft system block diagram (Fig. 7 )  and 
trace the relationships of all the following subsystems: 
Figure 8 illustrates further the method that we em- 
ploy in order to estimate subsystem reliability and to 
determine mission success probability. In the instance of 
the subsystem under investigation here-the power sup- 
ply-it would first be necessary to determine the prob- 
ability of acquiring thc Sun, and that, of course, is 
dependent upon a properly functioning attitude control 
system. Having determined the probability of Sun ac- 
quisition, we would next need to determine the prob- 
ability of having an operative solar array and battery 
Radio 
Data encoder 
Command 
Attitude control 
Power 
50 
J P L  SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS 
PROGRAM ENGINEERING AND PROJECT PROBLEMS 
~ 
COMMAND 
4 
I 
I l-- I 1 
- I 
ATTITUDE CONTROL - 
7 CENTRAL COMPUTER 
I 
I AND SEQUENCER * 2- 1 
I 
POWER I I 
* 
COMMUNICATIONS 
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I 1  
I 1  
- - ENCOUNTER DATA 
- ENGINEERING FUNCTIONS 
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I 
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- ENGINEERING AND CRUISE DATA I I - POWER I 1  
DATA AUTOMATION 
SUBSYSTEM 
I 
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'7 -- 
. I  I 
I I 
Fig. 7. Mariner block diagram 
2 4-kc 
POWER 
I I SUN ACQUISITION 
I t, 4 0 0 - C D S  
POWER 
400-CDS 
I INVERTEI 
Fig. 8. Power supply 
system to generate dc power; following that, booster 
regulator reliability would be determined. As shown in 
Fig. 8, there would then be two paths through which 
power could be obtained-the 2.4-kc inverter and the 
400-cps inverters. The probability of finally delivering 
power would be determined by mathematically com- 
bining the reliability probabilities of all the various 
power supply subsystem components, the solar array and 
battery system, the booster regulator, and the 2.4-kc 
and 400-cps inverters. 
In addition to studying subsystem reliability, we in- 
vestigate such reliability variables as the various flight 
phases and the influence on success probability of omit- 
ting one or two of them. Figure 9, which illustrates this 
aspect of the reliability study, presents four possible 
flight paths or options. Path A includes both the mid- 
course and the terminal maneuver; path B omits the 
midcourse; path C omits the terminal; path D omits 
both. 
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! I LAUNCH TO INJECTION 
I A  
CRUISE 
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I 
I 
I TERM I NAL I 
Fig. 9. Spacecraft reliability variables 
The reasons for conducting this part of the study can 
be shown by presenting some facts relative to the termi- 
nal maneuver, its value to the mission, and its effect 
upon mission success probability. First, the reason for 
the terminal maneuver is to point the spacecraft along the 
velocity vector so that as the spacecraft approaches 
the Moon the TV-camera view is optimum; if we did 
not employ a terminal maneuver the spacecraft would not 
be pointed along the velocity vector and the result- 
ing pictures would show a smear of the lunar surface. 
The chances for mission success, however, are considcr- 
ably better if the terminal maneuver is omitted. And 
here, of course, the problem is stated: Is the hazard 
involved in the terminal maneuver sufficient to justify 
omitting it and settling for pictures of lesser quality? 
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I t  is a tough decision to make, and we feel that the 
data we have assembled, including the reliability studies 
we have made, are helpful in bringing about the best 
decision. 
In this general area of reliability and success prob- 
ability, it should be pointed out that mission success is 
not oidiiiaiily a11 aii-or-nothing matter. I nere are gra- 
dations of success (or failure). The following listing 
presents a few of them: 
-. 
1. Complete success 
2. Complete mission 
3. Complete TV pictures 
4. Some good TV pictures 
5. Satisfactory spacecraft operation 
6. Predictable failure 
7. Failure 
Notice that between failure and success there is a rea- 
sonable amount of variance. 
During the course of these discussions, it has often 
been stated or implied that the space effort is a novel 
and unique undertaking. The area hasn't been charted, 
the books haven't been written, and the values haven't 
been assigned. In this latter regard, when Mariner 2 was 
out about half-way to Venus, we made a preliminary 
and rather primitive attempt to find out what people 
were thinking relative to the value of this space mis- 
sion, Table 4 presents a blank ballot that we used in a 
small sampling which attempted to assign kinds of value 
(political, scientific, etc.) to varying degrees of space mis- 
sion success. 
At the time, of course, we were particularly con- 
cerned with the possibility of a Mariner '64 flight. So we 
asked our voters to tell us what they thought the value 
of Mariner 2 was and what they thought the value of 
Mariner '64 would be if (1) Mariner 2 was successful or 
(2) Mariner 2 failed. Tables 5 and 6 give results of this 
balloting. Numerical values obtained from the sample 
ballot and shown in Tables 5 and 6 are relative, not abso- 
lute, values. 
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Table 4. Value weightings for planetary missions (sample ballot) 
Political Scientific Engineering 
Spacecraft operating correctly 
after launch 
Spacecraft through midcourse 
and in data mode 
Communications capability 
through t days 
Engineering data capability 
through t days 
Scientific data capability 
through t days 
Planetary distance reached 
Planetary data received 
Elements of  mission 
1. launch 
2. Midcourse 
3. Communications 
4. Engineering data 
5. Science data 
6. Planetary distance 
7. Planet data 
Military 
Minimum 
1.4 
3.1 
6.8 
6.0 
9.0 
9.9 
13.0 
Future recognition 
Table 5. Value assignments for Mariner 2 Table 6. Value assignments for Mariner 2 
Mean 
10.3 
12.3 
12.8 
10.9 
13.0 
15.4 
25.3 
Maximum 
21.0 
21.0 
17.0 
20.1 
19.2 
28.1 
42.6 
To repeat, this sampling was a first and wholly un- 
representative attempt. But it, like the reliability studies 
and the cost studies, was meant to be fitted into the 
over-all learning effort which must necessarily precede 
successful space exploration. 
To solve project problems, there are many things to 
consider. In my opinion project managers should allow 
freedom of initiative, but must coordinate all efforts to 
accomplish goals and have the fortitude for decision 
after intelligent evaluation. 
System engineering has not received adequate study, 
and with our large future in space, we must continue 
analytically and empirically to explore project problems. 
Elements of mission 
1. launch 
2. Midcourse 
3. Communications 
4. Engineering data 
5. Science data 
6. Planetary distance 
7. Planet data 
Total 
Categories 
A. Political 
B. Scientific 
C. Engineering 
D. Military 
E. Future 
F. Early failure 
recognition 
Total 
Mariner 2 '62 
Mean 
10.3 
12.3 
12.8 
10.9 
13.0 
15.4 
25.3 
100.0 
22.0 
26.7 
21.7 
6.6 
14.7 
8.3 
100.0 
Mariner R '64 
(Mariner 2 
successful) 
Mean 
7.3 
8.7 
9:7 
9.4 
10.0 
13.5 
23.3 - 
81.9 
17.7 
21.9 
18.8 
5.9 
11.3 
7.4 
- 
83.0 
(Mariner 2 
fails) 
Mean 
8.4 
10.3 
11.9 
10.8 
13.7 
15.8 
24.4 
95.3 
21.9 
28.0 
22.6 
6.8 
12.5 
8.1 
99.9 
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